Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 103 | Issue 3

Article 3

Summer 2013

Order, Technology, and the Constitutional
Meanings of Criminal Procedure
Thomas P. Crocker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas P. Crocker, Order, Technology, and the Constitutional Meanings of Criminal Procedure, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 685
(2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol103/iss3/3

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/13/10303-0685
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2013 by Thomas P. Crocker

Vol. 103, No. 3
Printed in U.S.A.

ORDER, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
THOMAS P. CROCKER *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRIORITIZING ORDER-MAINTENANCE
POLICING ........................................................................................... 693
II. UNITED STATES V. JONES ON PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY ............... 702
A. The Majority Opinion: Personal Property Rights as Protection
Against Police Surveillance Technologies....................................703
B. The Concurring Opinions: Protecting Privacy Against a
Permeating Police Presence ........................................................705
C. Order-Maintenance Policing and the Future of Jones...................711
III. KENTUCKY V. KING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ...................................................................... 714
A. Inverting Johnson: The Exception as Rule ..................................716
B. Knock, Knock: Consent and Deviance Under the Exception ........719
C. The Citizen-Created Exigency ...................................................725
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS OF ORDERLINESS AND THE FUTURE
OF TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................... 732
A. From King to After Jones ..........................................................734
B. Order and Constitutional Values ................................................740
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 742

*

Distinguished Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of
Law; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank Josh Eagle
and Christopher Slobogin for providing valuable feedback on earlier drafts. I would also
like to thank Ronald Allen, Derek Bambauer, David Gray, Stephen Henderson, and Andrew
Taslitz for fruitful conversations. I owe thanks to Zachary Horan for helpful research
assistance.

685

686

THOMAS P. CROCKER

[Vol. 103

With new technologies accompanied by new roles for police in
providing security and maintaining order, the Fourth Amendment’s
relevance to modern life is becoming increasingly tenuous. In fact, one
federal appeals court judge recently announced the death of the Fourth
Entrenched constitutional doctrine and technological
Amendment. 1
advances have worked together to kill it. The Fourth Amendment protects
only reasonable expectations of privacy, but the Supreme Court claims one
cannot have an expectation of privacy in anything shared with another
person—and we share practically everything. As a result, “the Fourth
Amendment is all but obsolete.” 2 The third-party doctrine, which removes
Fourth Amendment protection from information shared with another person
or entity, 3 and the circularity of expectations of privacy, which depend on
both judicial and social interpretive practices,4 have all but interred it. A
dead Amendment combined with robust police practices may not augur a
robust constitutional future in light of new technological and social
practices. 5
Perhaps it is too soon to eulogize the Fourth Amendment as Judge
Kozinski does, though it is indeed in dire health as it struggles to be
relevant to the changing technological means by which government may
conduct surveillance of everyday activities.6 Global-Positioning-System
1

Alex Kozinski & Stephanie Grace, Pulling Plug on Privacy: How Technology Helped
Make the 4th Amendment Obsolete, THE DAILY (June 22, 2011, 9:12 AM),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/2738236/posts.
2
Id.
3
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[The Supreme Court]
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–
82 (1983) (holding persons have no expectation of privacy in their publicly viewable
location on a road); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding persons have
no expectation of privacy in information conveyed to a bank).
4
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[A]n expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and
hence subjective and unpredictable.”); see also Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60–61 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is
circular, for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if
the Court has held that a search in that area would be unreasonable.”).
5
The end of privacy need not be the end of the Fourth Amendment, as scholars have
emphasized its other meanings, including privacy and liberty. See John D. Castiglione,
Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 661 (arguing that
“dignity captures a core Fourth Amendment value that privacy does not”); Thomas P.
Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 69 (2009) (arguing for a refocusing of Fourth Amendment doctrine to protect
liberty); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment “should stop trying to protect privacy”).
6
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
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(GPS) tracking enhances the power of police to monitor everyday
movements and activities of persons at increasingly lower cost. This
doctrinal and technological backdrop makes the Supreme Court’s ruling in
United States v. Jones 7—that police placement of a GPS tracking device on
a vehicle without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment—all the more
important. Even here, the holding in Jones is limited to occasions when
police physically occupy “private property for the purpose of obtaining
information” 8 without a warrant, leaving many questions about future GPS
use unanswered and, in the process, reviving the importance of physical
intrusion, not simply “reasonable expectations of privacy,” for Fourth
Amendment analysis. 9 For example, in the absence of physical intrusion,
how might the Constitution regulate GPS surveillance using cell phones or
other devices already on a person or in an automobile? What constitutional
values are at stake when police engage in temporally extended
comprehensive monitoring of personal movements and transactions?
The problem surveillance techniques create for jurists and scholars
alike is exacerbated by the fact that current Fourth Amendment doctrine has
developed in the shadow of order-maintenance policing practices focused
on visible social disorder in public space. Order-maintenance policing was
inspired by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling’s Atlantic Monthly article,
Broken Windows, speculating that serious crime, as well as social decay,
could be forestalled by more aggressive street-level police enforcement of
minor criminal behavior such as vagrancy, panhandling, vandalism, and the
like. 10 Order-maintenance practices in turn pressure constitutional doctrine
to authorize greater police discretion and to rely on citizen consent or selfassertion to define the constitutional boundaries of searches and seizures
while narrowing the scope of social practices deemed private.
Technologically enhanced police practices may be able to discern ever more
subtle and hidden forms of disorder, extending order-maintenance priorities
into new spaces, including the home. In turn, facilitative doctrine enables
the growth of new police practices that illuminate forms of disorder lurking
in these freshly transparent spaces.

1309, 1313–20 (2012) (detailing ways that technology complicates privacy).
7
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
8
Id. at 949.
9
Under the privacy jurisprudence since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the
Court repeatedly claimed that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Id. at
351. The approach taken by the majority in Jones does not reject Katz, even as it revives an
approach that protects places from physical intrusion by police, dependent on preserving
original understandings of the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50.
10
See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29–30.
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The problem technology creates for Fourth Amendment doctrine is
therefore twofold. First, the problem is whether or how existing
constitutional doctrines might apply to new technologies; but second, the
problem is what conceptions of constitutional values, priorities, and
policing practices will inform doctrinal development and choice. My claim
is that no answer to the former issue will be adequate without tackling the
latter. And to approach the conceptual issue, we must recognize that
without fundamental revision of underlying values and purposes, future
cases will be decided in light of the constitutional meanings of criminal
procedure made available by the existing doctrinal frameworks that
produced the Fourth Amendment’s eulogy. Doctrinal tinkering will not
suffice. Nor will the quietism produced by defending the status quo.11 The
stakes are high because social practices increasingly conflict with police
expectations. And those expectations now encompass the ability of
individual officials to acquire information and conduct surveillance by
means once thought only possible for someone with a “god’s eye view.” 12
To track an individual’s movements in a car over a month would have
once required considerable police resources, with officers conducting
physical surveillance around the clock. Now, by simply attaching a
tracking device to the underside of the bumper, a single police officer can
sit comfortably in an office and accomplish the same end. What is the
proper way to articulate the doctrinal issue and the constitutional values at
stake in this technological advance? In Jones, the majority opinion looks
no further than the fact that police conducted a “search” where they
“physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.” 13 For the majority, common law trespass formed a sufficient
basis to decide this case without reference to the expectations of privacy or
other interests the Fourth Amendment might protect. By contrast, Justice
Sotomayor’s separate concurrence and Justice Alito’s concurrence for four
Justices each rely on broader constitutional values of privacy and political
freedom. What is at stake is unavoidably interpretive. Whether a two-day
monitoring of a person suspected of committing a minor offense or a sixmonth monitoring of a terrorism suspect will violate a potential rule that

11

See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 315–20 (2012) (defending the current sequential approach to the Fourth Amendment).
12
Not only is the perspective qualitatively different, but also the sheer capacity for data
storage of a person’s movements and phone conversations is different. See JOHN
VILLASENOR, CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION, BROOKINGS INST., RECORDING EVERYTHING:
DIGITAL STORAGE AS AN ENABLER OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS (2011), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/14%20digital%20storage%
20villasenor/1214_digital_storage_villasenor.
13
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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“longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges
on expectations of privacy” 14 requires construction of both the social and
constitutional meanings of such police practices. Interpretation is not an
abstract exercise of divining meaning from constitutional text isolated from
the culture and practices that give it life.15 Rather, interpretation is possible
only in light of background priorities, practices, and values the Supreme
Court has in view. Thus, the question for the future of the Fourth
Amendment is not simply what doctrinal rules the Court should adopt.
Rather, the question is how, and on what normative basis, the Court will
construct the social and constitutional meanings of technologically enabled
policing practices.
This Article explores how current Fourth Amendment doctrine,
whether construed in terms of property rights or expectations of privacy,
facilitates background order-maintenance conceptions of police practice. 16
Order maintenance becomes a more powerful, and an even more
problematic, priority when it comes to electronic monitoring. The doctrinal
model focuses on the personal interactions between citizens and police on
the community street. Police officers are expected to respond to visible
displays of social disorder. Visibility is therefore key to the broken
windows approach. But technology alters what is visible. With more
powerful tools that can make visible more subtle or hidden forms of
disorder, the model of street-level police interaction changes as well. Since
extended secret surveillance of a person’s movements on public streets or
electronic monitoring of a person’s activities as revealed to third parties
could each be conducted to ferret out the social disorder lurking beneath
sequentially quotidian movements and activities, larger patterns of disorder
indiscernible to the episodic street encounter can now be made visible.
Only by looking at the bigger picture might the disorder become apparent to
government officials, especially for more serious offenses requiring
complex coordination. Government officials have already relied on this
“mosaic theory”—that larger patterns of wrongdoing might lie hidden
14

Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 62 (2011) (emphasizing how constitutional meaning depends on the
temporally contingent constitutional culture in which it is embedded); Thomas P. Crocker,
Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 57–70 (2007).
16
Under this conception, Fourth Amendment doctrine focuses on the needs of police
rather than the liberties of citizens, as if by analogy the object of First Amendment doctrine
were to provide clear rules to facilitate the censorship of speech, rather than to protect
uninhibited public debate. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”). For more
on the relation between the First and Fourth Amendments, see Thomas P. Crocker, The
Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 332–45 (2010).
15
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within everyday patterns—in other national security contexts. 17 Federal
interests in protecting national security require information sharing with
state and local police in order to discern crime patterns and to anticipate
security threats. Because pursuit of this “mosaic theory” has involved state
and local police, there is no barrier to adopting similar routine policing
practices that seek to make visible the indiscernible disorder concealed
behind apparent patterns of everyday orderly behavior.18
Current constitutional doctrine provides scant barriers to such
permeating police practices. 19 Doctrine focuses on expectations of
privacy—on information shared, searched, or withheld—not on how
persons occupy physical spaces such as streets. As this Article argues, if
courts extend the deference they afford everyday order-maintenance
policing to the mosaic of electronic monitoring, then the Fourth
Amendment will provide few protections against advancing search
technologies. This order-maintenance deference is manifest through three
doctrinal themes: increased reliance on individual constitutional
responsibility, increased emphasis on consensual encounters, and expanded
control over visible space. Each of these themes is on display in Justice
Alito’s majority opinion in Kentucky v. King, 20 a case involving an
everyday, low technology law enforcement setting. This Article argues that

17
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As with the
‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security
information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one
who has a broad view of the scene.’”) (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)).
Government officials have invoked the “mosaic theory” in other national security contexts.
See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
North Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002). Criticism of
government reliance on the theory can be found in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE
STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 20–21 (2003)
(criticizing reliance on mosaic theory in immigration proceedings), and in David E. Pozen,
Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE
L.J. 628, 664 (2005) (“[C]ourts ought to review these claims with extra scrutiny and
skepticism on account of their susceptibility to misuse.”).
18
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1444 (2011) (“Fusion centers facilitate a
domestic intelligence network that collapses traditional distinctions between law
enforcement and foreign wars, between federal and state authorities, and between
government surveillance and corporate data practices.”).
19
Current doctrine is focused on expectations and ignores the role that visible space
plays in ordering our lives. See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and
Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 191 (2008) (“[P]revailing legal understandings of spatial
privacy do not recognize a harm that is distinctively spatial: that flows from the ways in
which surveillance, whether visual or data-based, alters the spaces and places of everyday
life.”).
20
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
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the possible future of Fourth Amendment protections against electronic
monitoring after Jones requires understanding the constitutional meanings
developed in aid of order-maintenance policing as exemplified in King. So
long as the Supreme Court emphasizes order-maintenance policing’s
priorities, then the meanings of constitutional criminal procedure will
remain tethered to norms of visible order constructed by social and political
practices that give scant consideration to the value of privacy. If Americans
are to avoid continuing the same constitutional story that has produced a
near moribund Amendment, then new conceptions of Fourth Amendment
values are necessary before any new doctrinal tests regulating GPS
monitoring are likely to succeed. 21 These new conceptions require us to
place the privacy and liberty rights of the people, not merely the
investigatory needs of police, at the forefront of constitutional thought and
practice.
In response to the challenge of technology, some scholars see Fourth
Amendment doctrine adjusting over time to imbalances of power between
criminals and police caused by the ways that technology facilitates criminal
acts. 22 Other scholars, and at least one Supreme Court Justice, see the need
to refashion judicial doctrine for the digital age by recognizing that privacy
can protect the complex ways that persons share information. 23 Still others
focus on the role other institutions play in regulating policing practice
outside the context of constitutional criminal procedure.24 Each of these
responses to changing technologies requires that we first have in view the
meanings the Court provides to citizen–police interactions both through
interpreting constitutional text or doctrine and by interpreting the policing
practices themselves in light of the social expectations individuals might
have. Are particular practices consensual conversations, voluntary thirdparty disclosures, assumed risks of revealed secrets, threshold colloquies, or

21

See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2012) (providing “a springboard for a much-needed codification of searchrelated doctrine”).
22
See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011). For criticism of this view, see Christopher Slobogin, An
Original Take on Originalism, 125 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 14, 14 (2011).
23
Justice Sotomayor comments that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties” because such an “approach is ill suited to the digital age.” United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Scholars have called for
abandoning the third-party doctrine. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment
Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 747, 753 (2005).
24
See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012).
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reasonable police observations? Or are these practices coerced interactions,
violations of privacy expectations, intrusions on property rights, searches
under the Fourth Amendment, suppressions of associational and expressive
freedoms, or otherwise too permeating a police presence? Facts do not
come prepackaged with interpretations already enclosed. 25
If constitutional rights deny police the flexibility to engage in
discretionary stops and frisks, or if police are stymied in their judgments
about enforceable misconduct, then constitutional meanings constrain
police practice even as they construct the norms for police–citizen
Whatever form of judicial adjustment, institutional
interactions. 26
regulation, democratic involvement, or doctrinal developments might occur,
at stake with changing technologies is that they “may alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.” 27 How the Court constructs changing technologies in light of
constitutional values will shape both future social and police practices and
their constitutional meanings. When we authorize police surveillance that
makes visible through technology what might have otherwise gone
unnoticed to official eyes, we change the nature of the underlying conduct
and its social meanings. It is no accident that Justice Sotomayor turns to the
First Amendment in Jones to observe how “[a]wareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive
freedoms.” 28 Awareness of how far order-maintenance priorities extend
into everyday doctrine is a necessary first step to reconsidering how the
Constitution should protect political liberty and privacy.
This Article begins in Part I by considering the order-maintenance
theory of policing and its influence in shaping constitutional meanings.
Part II takes up the new kind of order challenged by complex crimes hidden
25
Bernard Harcourt takes up the interpretive task to argue, “The social meaning of the
proposed police practices does not simply change our behaviors; it may fundamentally alter
the way we think about and judge other people, and the way we relate to others. These law
enforcement techniques may form us . . . .” BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER:
THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 218 (2001).
26
Social norm theorists advocating order-maintenance policing criticize courts for using
constitutional provisions to constrain police discretion. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling
Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning,
105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1247–48 (1996) (“Judges should refrain from using the generally
worded clauses of the United States Constitution to create a national code that denies cities
sufficient room to experiment with how to grapple with street disorder.”); Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153,
1166 (1998) (criticizing the Court for striking down Chicago’s antigang loitering ordinance
as a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
27
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. CuevasPerez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
28
Id. at 955.
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in the mosaic of everyday life. Policing practices designed to render visible
complex disorder require constitutional meanings that find no harms in
comprehensive electronic monitoring. The future direction of the Fourth
Amendment for electronic surveillance begins with United States v. Jones.
But the future after Jones, Part III argues, relies on the constitutional
meanings of criminal procedure on display in the Court’s recent decision in
King. Because King draws the support of eight members of the Court, it is
an instructive place to see how order-maintenance priorities have shaped the
constitutional meanings of police practices in addition to judicial
constructions of privacy expectations even when the setting is the home.
As Part IV argues, the meanings and judicial attitudes on display in King
will in turn play an important role in constructing the constitutional
meanings of criminal procedure for police practices using new electronic
technologies. The Fourth Amendment’s future as constitutional law, not
merely as an increasingly moribund adjunct to policing practice, depends on
how we attend to more comprehensive constitutional meanings of political
liberty and personal privacy.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRIORITIZING ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING
By enforcing “public order” against vandalism, panhandling, or other
minor street crime, police are said to play a role in altering the public
meaning and social influence of crime. 29 According to the theory of ordermaintenance policing, authorities can reduce overall crime rates by
changing the degree of tolerance for public disorder. 30 Social norms of
orderliness have meaning within practices that are open to influence and
interpretation. When order gives way to disorder, social meanings change
in ways that normalize conduct once thought unacceptable.31 Because of
29

See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 369 (1997) (“Visible disorder is a self-reinforcing cue about the community’s attitude
toward crime.”). Social norms influence behavior because they often have pliable social
meaning. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
961 (1995) (“Social meaning construction is about social meaning change.”). It is important
to understand not only how norms influence behavior, but also to understand how norms are
formed. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 391 (1997). Academic attention on the relationship between norms and
law owes much to ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
30
The order-maintenance approach to crime relies on the broken windows theory
advanced in Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 29. See also WESLEY G. SKOGAN,
DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS
65–84 (1990).
31
See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City,
32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 806 (1998) (“By shaping preferences for crime, accentuating the
perceived status of lawbreaking, and enfeebling the institutions that normally hold criminal
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this dynamic, one way to change practices is to change meanings. When
police cease to tolerate low-level street disorder, then the social acceptance,
and thereby the social meaning, of disorder can be reconstructed to conform
to new norms of orderliness. Order-maintenance policing, however,
requires police discretion. To succeed, police officers require latitude “to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving,” constrained only by a standard of reasonableness the
Supreme Court constructs. 32
In their famous article, Broken Windows, James Q. Wilson and
George Kelling’s thesis is that visible disorder—broken windows,
abandoned property, litter, and the like—produces decay in the commitment
to norms of legal obedience. 33 Legal decay made visible by the
community’s unattended broken windows produces social decay.
According to Wilson and Kelling, disorder creates a causal sequence that
begins when some people stop complying with legal and social norms and
declines further as others follow suit. Once disorder begins to take root,
those committed to living in a community that reflects law-abiding norms
will abandon the neighborhood, leaving behind even greater social decline.
“A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes . . . can
change, in a few years or even a few months, to an inhospitable and
frightening jungle.” 34 The way to reverse this causal chain is to fight crime
at the level of street disorder.
Appearance is, or can be, reality. Order-maintenance policing is
designed to forestall this causal sequence, reinforcing norms of orderliness
in a way that makes visible to the community a commitment to law
enforcement and compliance. 35 More than enforcing compliance with legal
norms, this approach aims to change social meanings by reinforcing
compliant behaviors.36 A community’s level of toleration for minor
disorder can be a clue to the social meaning criminal behavior might have
within the community. Toleration of crime reduces the stigma, and hence
propensities in check, disorderly norms create crime.”).
32
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
33
Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 31. As they describe it: “A piece of property is
abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the
children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move
in. . . . Fights occur. Litter accumulates.” Id. at 32.
34
Id. at 31–32.
35
See SKOGAN, supra note 30, at 100; WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT,
COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 110 (1997).
36
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 29, at 351 (“Cracking down on aggressive panhandling,
prostitution, open gang activity and other visible signs of disorder may be justifiable on this
ground, since disorderly behavior and the law’s response to it are cues about the
community’s attitude toward more serious forms of criminal wrongdoing.”).
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the individual cost, for additional persons to engage in criminal activity.
Maintaining order, by contrast, is a way of expressing the positive social
meaning of legal norms. Norms of orderliness increase the individual cost
of crime in part by changing the visible meaning of criminal conduct.
Community and order-maintenance policing have proven popular in
some American cities, producing in their wake, however, an increase in
stops and frisks as well as arrests for misdemeanor offenses. 37 For
example, in 2009 alone, the New York Police Department stopped and
questioned more than half a million persons and, in 2011, more than
600,000. 38 The impact of these practices has fallen disproportionately on
minority groups and on specific communities. 39 Accompanying these
practices has been an increase in official disorder as the prevalence of
official illegality has risen.40
On Wilson and Kelling’s own account, when police maintain public
order, some persons were “roughed up, people were arrested ‘on suspicion’
or for vagrancy, and prostitutes and petty thieves were routed. ‘Rights’
were something enjoyed by decent folk, and perhaps also by the serious
professional criminal, who avoided violence and could afford a lawyer.”41
Notice that the order-maintenance approach acknowledges and
contemplates that one form of illegality and disorder will displace another.42
It also assigns considerable discretion to the individual police officer;
Wilson described in his other work, “The police are watchman-like not
simply in emphasizing order over law enforcement but also in judging the
seriousness of infractions less by what the law says about them than by their
immediate and personal consequences . . . .” 43
37
See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 155 (1996) (claiming this
method greatly reduced crime in New York City). After considerable expansion of the
practice, public outcry has had effects on the future of the current practice in New York. See
Joseph Goldstein & Wendy Ruderman, Police Stops in New York Drop by 34%, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2012, at A1.
38
See, e.g., Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C.L. UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stopand-frisk-data (last visited May 20, 2013).
39
See id.; Al Baker, New York Police Release Data Showing Rise in Number of Stops on
Streets, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2012, at A19.
40
See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police
Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 343 tbl.6 (2004)
(reporting findings of large numbers of unconstitutional searches in everyday police
practice).
41
Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 33.
42
The consequences of this view are explored in Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of
Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1165–66 (1966).
43
JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 141 (1968). Moreover, “[i]n any particular case, the
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Transformations of criminal procedure are capable of making
yesterday’s menace today’s method. Curtailing police discretion was once
a key feature of constitutional criminal procedure. Even Terry v. Ohio
sought to impose a standard applicable to street-level police discretion that
balanced policing with privacy. 44 Moreover, past policing practices
imposed disproportionate injustices on minority communities, particularly
in the American South. The once emerging constitutional criminal
procedure addressed racial injustice.45 As criminal procedure moved from
the realm of a due process standard that curbed the most egregious forms of
police brutality and judicial process—for example, torture in Mississippi, 46
mob-dominated proceedings in Arkansas, 47 and farcical trials in
Alabama 48—to the incorporation of Bill of Rights protections,49 one of the
dominant issues was racial injustice.
But times have changed, Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares argue, and the
life cycle of criminal procedure must now give way to new policing
methods backed by political support from minority communities.50
Academic supporters emphasize the changed political context that gives
new meaning and acknowledges less to fear from the discretion entailed by
community and order-maintenance policing. Supreme Court opinions also
reflect greater trust in police professionalism. 51 Where one of the primary
patrolman may act improperly by abusing or exceeding his authority, making arrests or street
stops on the basis of personal prejudice or ill-temper.” Id. at 278.
44
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
45
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 117–35 (2004); Tracey Maclin, Race and
the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 364–65 (1998).
46
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
47
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91–92 (1923).
48
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 71–73 (1932).
49
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1968) (applying Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying
the Fourth Amendment).
50
Kahan & Meares, supra note 26, at 1154 (“The new doctrine must recognize the
legitimate function of discretionary policing techniques in combating inner-city crime, and
also the competence of inner-city communities to protect themselves from abusive police
behavior.”). But discretionary stops and frisks continue to be disproportionately practiced.
See Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked: Increase in Police Stops Fuels
Intense Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1.
51
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006) (“Another development over
the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing professionalism of
police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline.”). Professionalism,
however, does not solve the problem of cognitive bias impacting police reasoning. See
Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for,
Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 25–27
(2010).
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sources of police abuse was once the discretion police possessed over
public spaces and public order, 52 that same authority can be a virtue in the
new political climate. Where before police discretion was used against
minority communities, it can now be used at the behest of these
communities to maintain order and reinforce social norms of orderliness. 53
These calls for changing social meaning through order-maintenance
policing have produced a new criminal procedure with new constitutional
meanings. The production of new constitutional meanings takes time and
emerges from the interlacing web of many cases. Take the results in
Illinois v. Wardlow as an example. 54 Not only do police have unfettered
authority to stop and frisk individuals they find on the streets, so long as
they can articulate reasonable suspicion,55 but they also have interpretive
authority to view individuals who might seek to avoid this procedure as
suspicious. In this case, a man saw police vehicles driving slowly into the
neighborhood. He began running from the area, causing police officers to
give pursuit. 56 The Supreme Court applied a totality of the circumstances
test to determine that flight from an area known for narcotics trafficking at
the sight of a police officer constituted reasonable suspicion.57 Although
the Court intones in other contexts that an individual has a right to “decline
to listen to the [police] questions at all and may go on his way,” 58 when
police seek a consensual colloquy, that same individual who takes proactive
action to avoid the police encounter altogether becomes a legitimate subject
of police suspicion. 59
In such cases of police-initiated encounters, there is an acceptable
script 60—in Wardlow, that one must not seek to avoid a police encounter—
52

See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1972);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 362–63 (1964).
53
Kahan & Meares, supra note 26, at 1160 (“Both the political and the litigation
dynamics surrounding discretionary policing techniques have changed dramatically.”); see
also Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 71, 101 (2003) (arguing that community policing practices “suggest[] the importance
of promoting trust, here between citizens and the police”).
54
528 U.S. 119 (2000).
55
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
56
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121–22.
57
Id. at 124–25.
58
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983).
59
Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court used this reasoning to hold that the officers were
not justified in searching the defendant. Illinois v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 485, 488–89
(Ill. Sup. Ct. 1998).
60
The idea that social scripts play a role in organizing social interactions and practical
knowledge comes from work in social psychology and related fields. See, e.g., ERVING
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974);
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deviation from which justifies an intrusive police response. “Allowing
officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate
further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his
business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.” 61
Citizens are allowed to remain silent when questioned, but they are not free
to avoid the questioning altogether. In so holding, the Court construes the
social meaning of public space in a way that further enables police to
maintain order, often under conditions officers have the discretion to define.
Moreover, constitutional meaning creates social meaning, as the Court
understands the Fourth Amendment to prefer the “more minimal intrusion”
of a Terry stop as a means of police investigation62 but not to protect the
individual’s ability to avoid the intrusion in the first place.
By construing constitutional meaning to prefer certain kinds of
citizen–police encounters, the Court creates norms for police and citizens
alike to internalize. These norms increasingly rely on self-regulation by
both parties. That is, citizens must be aware of the constitutional limits of
police practices and assert them against potential encroachment without
support in the form of judicial enforcement. For example, citizens must
make their own judgments about when a nonconsensual police stop for a
traffic infraction transforms into a consensual colloquy that citizens are free
to terminate. 63
Police self-regulate in the context of negligent record keeping, 64
hearing noises inside a residence,65 or acting out of fear for public
safety 66—behaviors unattached from limiting Fourth Amendment norms.
These constitutionally enabled norms of citizen–police interactions
construct the boundaries in which we can expect future policing practice to
ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); ROGER C. SCHANK
& ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977); see also GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND
DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 68 (1987) (exploring
related phenomenon of how “we organize our knowledge by means of structures called
idealized cognitive models”).
61
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
62
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968).
63
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (holding that police are not required to
inform persons that they are “free to go” before seeking consent to search a vehicle).
64
See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to negligent record keeping); see also Erin Murphy,
Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803,
817–21 (2010).
65
See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (holding that police may forcibly
enter a residence without a warrant when they fear imminent destruction of evidence).
66
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (holding that home entry
without a warrant is reasonable to protect public safety).
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operate. Bernard Harcourt writes that “[s]ocially constructed meaning is at
the heart of social norm theorizing. With regard to each and every policy
recommendation, social meaning plays a pivotal, if not the pivotal, role.” 67
He goes on to claim that certain forms of community–police cooperation
“change[] the social meaning of the police by casting them in a new light
within the social fabric of the community, and change[] police officers’
perceptions of suspects.” 68 Taking this thought a step further, police
practice can also change the constitutional meaning of the citizen–police
interaction, which in turn can further construct the political nature of that
interaction.
In a similar fashion, constitutional cases can change the political
meaning of police practices by casting them in a new social role, changing
police officers’ perceptions of their own obligations and priorities.
Constitutional cases construct constitutional meaning, which does not hover
above political practices like a “brooding omnipresence in the sky,” 69 but
expresses the articulable views of particular constitutional visions. The
cases order priorities by setting, or withdrawing, constraints on permissible
policing practices in ways that change the meaning of those practices. So
when it comes to questions of electronic surveillance, the doctrinal focus
wants to know whether a particular practice is permitted under the Fourth
Amendment. No doubt, a decision on this outcome is important. But it will
be important for reasons that go beyond establishing rules of conduct. A
constitutional decision on whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits, or fails
to restrict, electronic monitoring of citizens at the discretion of police will
give a political meaning to the relationship between citizen and state by
establishing the particular terms of their interaction. In this way, a decision
can never be simply about the effectiveness or propriety of regulating police
surveillance. A decision about electronic monitoring will in part construct
the political order.
When police practices use technology to make visible what would
otherwise remain unnoticed, they can change the nature of the underlying
conduct under surveillance. This insight is not new. Jeremy Bentham
designed the panopticon around the expectation that individuals would
conform their behavior in response to the possibility of being perpetually
watched. 70 Michel Foucault found in this insight a broader model for the
many ways that knowledge can be a form of visibility that is instrumental to

67

HARCOURT, supra note 25, at 38.
Id. at 39.
69
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
70
See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29–95 (Miran Božovič ed., Verso
1995) (1787).
68
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the exercise of power. 71 Technology that aggregates a person’s movements,
interpersonal interactions, or transactions is a way of making visible what
had remained unseen and, in doing so, making it subject to norms of
imposed order. Like the panopticon, these norms can function as internal
constraints. What counts as disorder depends on what is visible. Broken
windows can have a particular kind of public meaning because of the
availability of visual cues. What is visually unavailable will lack social
meaning under this dynamic. If the social decay were not visible, then the
causal chain leading to more serious crime could not unfold. But visibility
itself requires construction. If through technologically enabled surveillance
police seek out and make visible what lies hidden, then the state is able to
construct the meaning of the aggregated conduct it renders visible while
simultaneously imposing its own norms of order.
Constitutional criminal procedure can constrain or enable
constructions of visibility. 72 Public perception of police legitimacy can also
constrain or enable policing practices aimed at social meaning. When
police engage in practices perceived to be discriminatory or unfair, citizens
are less willing to cooperate with law enforcement or comply with legal
norms. 73 Police need legitimacy to maintain order.74 But what counts as
legitimate practice depends not only on nonconstitutional matters of the

71
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 207–08 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977) (“The panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of
its properties, was destined to spread throughout the social body; its vocation was to become
a generalized function. . . . Panopticism is the general principle of a new ‘political anatomy’
whose object and end are . . . the relations of discipline.”).
72
See Harmon, surpa note 24, at 786 (“Like courts, scholars since the Warren Court era
consider the problem of preventing constitutional violations, not the problem of regulating
the police.”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 781, 804 (2006) (focusing on the role of substantive criminal law in shaping
procedure).
73
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 349–56 (2011); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects
in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365,
369–71 (2010); see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 126–31 (2009); Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to
Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 191 (2009)
(“[T]he knowledge that the police are permitted to participate in crime, even for justifiable
ends, erodes public trust in the police.”).
74
Fair practices administered out of respect and equality provide legitimacy, as
Schulhofer and collegues argue. Schulhofer et al., supra note 73, at 338. They write: “The
procedural justice approach is grounded in empirical research demonstrating that compliance
with the law and willingness to cooperate with enforcement efforts are primarily shaped not
by the threat of force or the fear of consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’
beliefs that law enforcement agencies are legitimate.” Id.
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fairness, respect, and dignity citizens perceive in police actions, but also on
the constitutional meanings police actions have. Expectations that rights
protect citizens—that there are constitutional limits to policing practices—
inform public perception, even apart from having specific knowledge of
complex constitutional doctrine. Constitutional rules construct the available
meanings of police–citizen encounters. There are many ways to regulate
police practice—greater attention to empirical data, legislative guidance,
local supervision, political pressure, as well as through constitutional rules
and remedies. But all regulatory reform efforts and all problems of
governing police practice occur against a background of constitutional
meaning that has no less power to shape citizen and police behavior alike
than the social meaning of order and legitimacy do. Legitimacy is in part a
product of constitutional meaning. 75
Different conceptions of the relation between citizen and state
mediated by everyday policing practices are possible under the
Constitution. In the same way, different constitutional cultures can produce
different understandings of constitutional priorities. 76 Divergent views on
constitutional meaning can order alternative social and political practices by
making available particular ways of exercising the role of citizen or police.
And different views about constitutional criminal procedure will appeal to
contrasting conceptions of what values the Fourth Amendment is expected
to protect. So, for example, Justice Brandeis writing in dissent in Olmstead
has a broader conception of Fourth Amendment values than animates the
current order-maintenance orientation. He writes:
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized

75
Scholars often view constitutional decisions as a principal way of regulating policing
activities, offering reform proposals to better accomplish regulatory goals. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 187
(2002); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994).
76
As Jack Balkin notes, “[a] constitutional culture consists of the beliefs of members of
the political community about what their constitution means.” BALKIN, supra note 15, at
178; see also Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 76 (2003) (“Constitutional law draws inspiration, strength,
and legitimacy from constitutional culture, which endows constitutional law with orientation
and purpose.”); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1342 (2006)
(“[P]opular confidence that the Constitution is the People’s is sustained by understandings
and practices that draw citizenry into engagement with questions of constitutional meaning
and enable communication between engaged citizens and officials charged with enforcing
the Constitution.”).

702

THOMAS P. CROCKER

[Vol. 103

men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
77
of the Fourth Amendment.

If social meaning is at stake in how the police approach public
disorder, social imaginaries play a role in shaping constitutional values and
doctrines.
What the philosopher Charles Taylor calls the “social
imaginary” 78 gives salience to particular values and visions of constitutional
relevance. For Justice Brandeis, giving articulation to “the right to be let
alone” is central to the task of implementing the Fourth Amendment. 79 For
Taylor, a social imaginary “is in fact that largely unstructured and
inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, within which particular
features of our world show up for us in the sense that they have. It can
never be adequately expressed in the form of explicit doctrines because of
its unlimited and indefinite nature.”80 Narrow and explicit doctrine does
not give us a sense, by itself, of the background situation in which it gives
meaning to constitutional values. But doctrine must arise out of a
background. Order-maintenance conceptions have played a significant role
in shaping this background social imaginary and continue to shape available
responses to changing technologies. But as Justice Brandeis’s dissent
suggests, broader conceptions of the constitutional values at stake are
possible.
Differing social imaginaries are always possible, as the following
section explores. In contrast to Justice Brandeis’s approach, the majority
opinion in Jones expresses no such broad values, focusing instead on the
intrusion on property rights and deferring to a future case the need to
articulate the constitutional meaning of technologically enhanced police
surveillance.
II. UNITED STATES V. JONES ON PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY
Justice Kennedy opens his majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas by
declaring that both the “spatial and more transcendent dimensions” of the
“liberty of the person” 81 are matters of constitutional concern. Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in United States v. Jones, by contrast, focuses
77

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 23 (2004).
79
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the Constitution
successfully.”); see also Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1347 (2010) (arguing that Justice Brandeis’s dissent implements a
broader conception of “intellectual privacy”).
80
TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 25.
81
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
78
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only upon constitutional protections for the spatial aspects of liberty, 82 even
when the technology at issue has the power to affect greatly the more
transcendent dimensions. These two aspects of liberty are mutually
entailing. A decision to focus on physical space will have effects on other
freedoms as well. As this section argues, by focusing on physical invasions
of private property, the Court leaves in place order-maintenance
constitutional meanings despite the power of the technology at issue to
enable widespread intrusions upon the liberty and privacy of the individual.
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: PERSONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS
PROTECTION AGAINST POLICE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES

As we have already seen, United States v. Jones establishes a Fourth
Amendment limitation on police use of electronic surveillance that relies on
a GPS device physically placed on a person’s automobile. 83 The Court
provides a narrow decision, focusing on the Fourth Amendment’s
protections against intrusions on property rights. The Court writes: “We
hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,
constitutes a ‘search.’” 84 The problem with the government’s placing a
GPS device on Jones’s vehicle was that it “physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information.” 85 When Olmstead held
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to electronic eavesdropping
absent a trespass, Fourth Amendment protections were thought to have a
close connection to property. 86 After Katz v. United States overruled
Olmstead and held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,” 87 Fourth Amendment protections swept more broadly to encompass
reasonable expectations of privacy. 88 But even then, expectations of
privacy were themselves often based on property interests possessed by
individuals. 89
82

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id.
84
Id. at 949.
85
Id. at 950.
86
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 445, 457 (1928); see also Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942).
87
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
88
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
89
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that there is no
expectation of privacy in trash “abandoned” in trash bags placed at the curb in front of one’s
home); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (holding that there is no
expectation of privacy in “open fields”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971)
(finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police transmit defendant’s conversations);
see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
83
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According to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court, “[t]he text of the
Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since
otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right of the people to be
secure’” 90 without reference to their “persons” or to particular places.
Claiming that the Fourth Amendment is closely tied to common law
trespass, Justice Scalia views the Katz expectations-of-privacy framework
as supplementing, not replacing, a property-based approach. 91 But as
supplement, the Katz expectations-of-privacy framework need not be
necessary to resolution of cases when physical trespass is present. In this
way, by focusing on the intrusion on property rights, the Court is able to
sidestep thornier issues of privacy expectations in personal movements in
public. A search occurs when police derive information from a physical
trespass.
Government use of technology, according to Jones, is limited by the
property rights persons have to exclude others from invading their
interests. 92 What happens when no property right is infringed? Do police
impermissibly search when monitoring a person’s movements in a manner
that does not involve a trespass?
Public visibility leads to police accessibility. The Supreme Court has
emphasized the fact that when police conduct surveillance of a person’s
public movements, they do nothing more than any member of the public
might do. In United States v. Knotts, the Court reasons that “[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares . . . voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction.”93 Without additional analysis,
GPS monitoring of a person’s public movements conveys no more
information than a person conveys to anyone who happens to be looking,
because as Justice Scalia notes in Jones, the Court has “not deviated from
the understanding that mere visual observation does not constitute a
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 815–27 (2004).
90
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
91
But see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1739, 1744 (2000) (“Neither the text nor the background of the Fourth Amendment
suggests it aims merely to codify eighteenth-century rules of search and seizure.”).
92
132 S. Ct. at 951–52. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others is more than just
‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”).
93
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); see also New York v. Class,
475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986) (“The exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and
thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’”). But see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 717 (1984) (distinguishing information obtained about public locations from
information obtained about the interior of the home when monitoring an electronic tracking
device).
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search.” 94 Strict application of prior cases would mean that nontrespassory
electronic monitoring is a form of visual surveillance permitted by the
Fourth Amendment. 95 And, to the extent that the analysis of privacy
expectations might lead to a different conclusion, Americans will have to
await a future decision.
B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AGAINST A
PERMEATING POLICE PRESENCE

Both concurrences in Jones, as well as the D.C. Circuit opinion below,
concluded that the type of electronic monitoring implicated in the case
violated Fourth Amendment prohibitions. Electronic GPS tracking raises
the stakes for public surveillance, since police may now be the passive
recipients of comprehensive information about a person’s movements. The
totality of the information obtained by this means can be far greater than
finite resources could make available to police in all but the most
extraordinary case and can do so in the most surreptitious manner. The
passive ability to obtain this information by using very few resources is a
technologically accreted power that may in fact change the nature of the
activity of public monitoring. As Judge Ginsburg wrote for the D.C. Circuit
in United States v. Maynard: “[T]he whole of a person’s movements over
the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is not just remote,
it is essentially nil.” 96 In her Jones concurrence, Justice Sotomayor
recognizes that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record
of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” 97
Knowledge about such intimate details of a person’s interpersonal life can
impact other constitutional liberties as well. If government officials can
monitor attendance at certain events, they can chill the same associational
rights the Court protected against state inquiry in a different era.98
94

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
See Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 460 (2007) (arguing that degree of intrusiveness itself
leads to the conclusion that GPS tracking is a search).
96
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). But see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998
(7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 291 (2007) (“Should government someday decide to
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to
decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a
search.”).
97
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
98
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
95
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The aggregate effect of electronic surveillance changes the meaning of
searches. Aggregation provides a perspective otherwise unavailable to
ordinary police investigation. Comprehensively tracking a person’s
movements over long periods and to all places provides police with what is
in effect a panoptic view of a person’s life and activities. Whether this
gives rise to changes in the constitutional meaning of such activity depends
on what principles and values the Court has in view. 99 By focusing on
order and the needs of the police officer on the beat, or by employing
doctrine to ask whether an invasion of property has occurred, liberty
interests will remain largely invisible.
If the Court attends to those aspects of GPS monitoring that alter the
nature of police investigations, then the aggregation and recording of a
person’s movements provide reasons to adjust the nature of the Fourth
Amendment inquiry. The simplest inquiry is to ask “whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated” 100
by police investigations without judicial or legislative supervision. But
when asking this question, attention to how recording and aggregating a
person’s movements allows government officials “to ascertain, more or less
at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on,”101 is
necessary. More than questioning what people might reasonably expect,
the Court must construct the meaning of policing practices that reveal and
compile information about political, religious, and interpersonal aspects of
people’s lives. Do these practices interfere with the people’s political
liberties? What harms might arise from government officials compiling
such information? How might such investigative activities chill speech and
associational freedoms?
What checks exist, absent constitutional
constraints, on the prospect for governmental abuse? These and other
questions highlight the possible impacts GPS monitoring might have on
political liberties the Fourth Amendment can be construed to protect.102
Existing Fourth Amendment doctrine, without expanded inquiry, is not
well suited “to curb arbitrary exercises of police power and to prevent ‘a too
permeating police surveillance.’” 103 The same doctrines that gave rise to
the early obituary for the Fourth Amendment with which this Article began
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech.”).
99
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (“It is the exploitation of
technological advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence.”).
100
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
101
Id.
102
See Crocker, supra note 16, at 371–78.
103
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
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are barriers to curbing police power. Foremost among these doctrines is the
third-party doctrine, which holds that persons have no expectation of
privacy in information they share with others or through transactions. 104
Once information is conveyed to another, a person loses the property-based
interest in controlling access to that information. The third party is free to
share the information with government officials independent of any Fourth
Amendment limitations. 105 In a digital age, we share vast amounts of data
with third parties. Our cell phone and Internet providers alone “know” a lot
about our movements and interests. Thus, on a straightforward application
of the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment is no barrier to
comprehensive electronic monitoring because persons are said to have no
expectation of privacy in the location information they share with third
parties as a condition of the services they enjoy. For this reason, Justice
Sotomayor suggests a need to reconsider the doctrine because “[t]his
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.” 106
Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment’s scope requires the Court
to recognize how disclosure of information functions within people’s lives
and how constitutional meanings impact the interaction between citizen and
state official. Justice Sotomayor recognizes that the doctrine asks the
wrong questions. We cannot bring into view the privacy and liberty
implications of pervasive and aggregated surveillance if public visibility is
construed broadly and is defeasible of constitutional protections.

104

See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
105
As Chief Justice Roberts has described the principle: “If an individual shares
information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in
turn share access to that information or those papers or places with the government.”
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 128 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
106
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Many scholars criticize this
doctrine, and have called for its reform. See Colb, supra note 75, at 123 (criticizing the
Court for “equating risk-taking with inviting exposure and equating limited-audience with
whole-world self-exposure”); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment,
or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1635 (1987) (“A view of the world
that recognizes the essential interconnectedness of people and the importance of intimacy
and sharing is foreign to the atomistic social theory underlying the Court’s present
doctrine.”); Crocker, supra note 5, at 7; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the
Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image
and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1357–63 (2004). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 600–01 (2009) (defending the third-party
doctrine).
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Such reconsideration goes beyond Justice Scalia’s two-step inquiry,
which first asks whether there is a physical intrusion and, if not, follows
Katz and asks whether expectations of privacy have been violated. In the
second step, privacy does not function as an independent concept of
analysis. Applying privacy to the changing nature of electronic surveillance
requires the Court to reexamine the constitutional meanings it has
constructed. Supreme Court doctrine has construed privacy to extend no
further than secrecy, a construction in significant tension with social
practices in the digital age. 107 Because a given social practice is not
discretely related to a single constitutional protection, Justice Sotomayor
recognizes that the constitutional meaning of privacy exists in the interplay
between the Fourth Amendment and other guaranteed freedoms citizens
enjoy in concert, such as rights to expression and association. 108
In establishing the meanings of privacy, and thereby the social and
political meanings of policing practices, the question of who should decide
on the terms of these interactions arises as well. Should the executive,
absent oversight by legislatures or courts, get to determine the nature and
extent of police interactions with citizens, or is there a robust role for the
Court to play in establishing constitutional limitations?109 Under a
Madisonian framework, the executive branch should not be entrusted to
make unchecked decisions that can alter the nature of police investigations
with the power derived from a comprehensive view of an individual’s
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
movements and interactions. 110
recognizes that all of these considerations are before the Court.
By contrast, Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence for four
members of the Court, rejecting Justice Scalia’s application of property
principles. In so doing, Justice Alito does not argue that the scope of the
Fourth Amendment needs reconsideration in light of how electronic
surveillance changes the nature of police searches. Rather, Justice Alito
simply suggests that “[t]he best that we can do in this case is apply existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in
a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person
would not have anticipated.” 111 In asking this question, Justice Alito
107

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 42–44 (2004).
108
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”).
109
See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 336–39 (2011) (explaining how economies of trust
function to legitimate who decides the meaning of law).
110
For a defense of Madisonian checks, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 11 (2010).
111
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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distinguishes between “relatively short-term monitoring,” 112 which is
consistent with expectations of privacy, and “the use of longer term GPS
monitoring,” which “impinges on expectations of privacy.” 113 How to
distinguish between the relatively short-term and the longer term
monitoring that would trigger Fourth Amendment constraints remains
indeterminate. Even then, long-term monitoring might not fall within
Fourth Amendment restrictions “in the context of investigations involving
extraordinary offenses.” 114 It just so happened that the investigation into
Jones’s activities, which included electronic monitoring for twenty-eight
days, had “surely crossed” 115 the line to become a search, and the nature of
the crime under investigation—narcotics trafficking—did not constitute an
“extraordinary offense.” 116
On the one hand, Justice Alito’s approach leaves in place the Katz
inquiry into reasonable expectations of privacy persons might have in their
public movements.
Without additional analysis, none of Justice
Sotomayor’s concerns about the relation of privacy to expressive and
associational freedoms fits within the traditional analysis. Nor does Justice
Alito contemplate the need to reconsider existing doctrine. Rather, “the
best we can do” is to apply the post-Katz doctrines as the Court has already
construed them. Expectations of privacy, not property rights, will continue
to control Fourth Amendment analysis.
On the other hand, by introducing two additional inquiries—the nature
of the offense and the temporal duration of the electronic monitoring—
Justice Alito proposes significant alterations to the Katz framework. Often,
the Court’s analysis of whether a police activity constitutes a search
depends on an all-or-nothing inquiry. Either looking into the container in
the vehicle is or is not a search.117 Either entry into a place such as a home
constitutes a search or not. 118 But here, Justice Alito suggests that the
nature of the activity is subject to variation by the duration of the
surveillance and the seriousness of the offense. These considerations allow
the Court to recognize that the quality and quantity of surveillance can
change the constitutional meaning of police activity. As Justice Scalia
notes in his majority opinion, however, such an approach yields several

112

Id.
Id.
114
Id. at 965.
115
Id. at 964.
116
Id. at 965.
117
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 822 (1982) (finding that search of any sealed container is a “search”).
118
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
113
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“particularly ‘vexing problems’” in applying the additional inquiries.119
How long does monitoring have to be to trigger the Fourth Amendment,
and what kind of offense must be under investigation? Justice Alito’s
approach does not provide grounds for making such determinations.120
Instead, such grounds are possible under Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence,
which finds additional support for Fourth Amendment prohibitions from
overlapping First Amendment values.
If “the best we can do” is apply existing doctrines to technologies
capable of changing the nature of the government’s power to conduct
searches, Judge Kozinski’s challenge of a moribund Amendment remains
salient. 121 As Justice Scalia notes, the Katz framework leads to doctrines
that “to date [have] not deviated from the understanding that mere visual
observation does not constitute a search.” 122 If electronic monitoring is
simply an extended means of visual observation of a person’s movements,
without any additional considerations, then existing doctrines will prevent
the Constitution from applying to modern technological changes. To make
the Fourth Amendment relevant to short-term monitoring, the third-party
doctrine will have to be reconsidered as Justice Sotomayor suggests, not
merely applied with durational limitations.
There are at least five Justices who see the importance of applying and
extending the Katz framework in new directions. Justice Sotomayor agrees
with Justice Scalia that the property intrusion is sufficient to decide the
facts in Jones, but also agrees with Justice Alito’s concurrence that longterm GPS monitoring violates expectations of privacy. How much further
expectations of privacy might extend is yet to be decided. A “too
permeating police surveillance” can occur just as much with episodic shortterm monitoring as it can with long-term surveillance. Of course, the
quantity of data revealed over time will be much greater than in shorter
durations, but the low-cost ability for police to discover many private facts
about an individual remains a concern for the political rights of the people
to be free from unfettered government discretion. 123
119
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (majority opinion) (quoting, with some disapprobation, the
concurrence).
120
See Kerr, supra note 11, at 330–31.
121
Dissenting in a case considering the constitutionality of electronic monitoring through
GPS or cell signals, Judge Kozinski notes that “these two technologies alone can provide law
enforcement with a swift, efficient, silent, invisible and cheap way of tracking the
movements of virtually anyone and everyone they choose.” United States v. PinedaMoreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
122
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001).
123
In this regard, Justice Sotomayor argues that unfettered discretion “may ‘alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.’” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
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But there is an important difference that may apply to relatively shortterm monitoring, which Justice Alito’s approach seems to contemplate.
Although he recognizes the “degree of circularity” that exists in judicial
assessments of privacy expectations, he posits that “relatively short-term
monitoring” is consistent with public expectations of privacy. 124 Only in
the relatively extreme case of month-long warrantless monitoring does
police activity upset the balance of privacy expectations under Justice
Alito’s approach. And rather than assert a robust role for the Court in
shaping constitutional meaning, Justice Alito suggests that legislative
solutions may be the best way to protect privacy. 125 By deferring to
legislative protections, Justice Alito may be signaling that the result in
Jones is based more on the long duration of monitoring than on recognition
of any changes in the nature of police searches conducted through
electronic means. 126 In contrast, the kinds of broader constitutional harms
that Justice Sotomayor identifies can occur even during relatively shortterm, yet pervasive, electronic monitoring. Because duration does no more
than amplify problems that exist from the outset of electronic monitoring,
we need more than mechanical and minor adjustments to existing Fourth
Amendment doctrines.
C. ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING AND THE FUTURE OF JONES

Shorter duration monitoring fits more readily within the framework of
order-maintenance policing. Such policing is premised in part on the fact
that controlling street-level disorder requires that officers have discretion to
respond to disorder’s visual cues. What electronic monitoring provides is a
different perspective—a god’s eye view—enabling officers to see and
address more complex patterns of disorder. So, even for a short duration,
disorder might appear within the mosaic of everyday activities not
otherwise readily discernible. Thus, if constitutional meanings contemplate
police power and discretion to see and address forms of social disorder,
then electronic monitoring is a technologically enhanced means of viewing
publicly visible, complex disorder.
One objection to this extension of order-maintenance policing might
be that by shifting the nature of visibility, police are changing the nature of
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
124
Id. at 961, 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
125
Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 89, at 805 (“[S]tatutory rules rather than constitutional
rules should provide the primary source of privacy protections . . . .”).
126
Justice Alito’s concurrence recognizes that “[f]or such offenses, society’s expectation
has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply
could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for
a very long period.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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order maintenance. Wilson and Kelling’s hypothesis, extended into the
realm of social norm theory by legal scholars, 127 was that readily visible
disorder played a part in constructing the social meaning of crime. By
signaling to a community that disorder will not be tolerated, police can
change the meaning of social norms. For this looping effect to work, the
disorder must initially be visible—the broken windows that every passerby
can see. 128 But in the case of complex disorder, there are no such readily
discernible cues. Because the disorder is hidden within the mosaic of
everyday public patterns, police need to use more comprehensive electronic
monitoring to aid their investigations. But if the complex disorder is not
visible, then there is no threat from the influence of the social meaning of
crime. If the law-abiding person cannot perceive the social disorder any
more than the unaided police officer, then hidden broken windows cannot
lead to changes in social norms.
The constitutional meanings of criminal procedure sweep broader than
the norm-driven motivation of broken windows and social-deterrence
theory. 129 Criminal procedure applies to investigation of both relatively
minor offenses, such as panhandling, prostitution, and other forms of street
disorder, and relatively more serious offenses, such as drug trafficking,
conspiracy, and organized criminal activity. If the goal of particular
constructions of the constitutional meaning of criminal procedure favors
deference and discretion to police practices, then these meanings apply in
both the ordinary and complex cases. Indeed, one aspect of the theory of
broken windows is the claim that by intervening in incidents of minor
disorder, police can forestall the development of more complex disorder. 130
On this account, street-level discretionary police practices are really in
service of preventing complex forms of social disorder. But where complex
forms of social disorder exist, they may still be known and visible to
members of the community, who might perceive the social meaning of
serious crime differently the less likely such crimes are to be investigated

127

See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 29, at 369; Lessig, supra note 29, at 951–55.
Wilson and Kelling also describe an experiment by Philip Zimbardo at Stanford of the
disorder that arose from the visibility of an abandoned car with a smashed window. See
Wilson & Kelling, supra note 10, at 31; see also Kahan, supra note 29, at 356.
129
As Kahan describes the motivation: “Cracking down on . . . visible signs of
disorder . . . may be justified on this ground, since disorderly behavior and the law’s
response to it are cues about the community’s attitude toward more serious forms of criminal
wrongdoing.” Kahan, supra note 29, at 351. These cues mean that “[w]hen citizens obey
norms of orderliness—and when authorities visibly respond to those who don’t—onlookers
see that the community is intolerant of criminality.” Id. at 371; see also SKOGAN, supra note
30, at 68–69.
130
See Kahan, supra note 29, at 370–71.
128
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and punished. 131 Such a hypothesis would have to be empirically tested,
but it is a consistent application of the social norm theory of criminal
deterrence. On this theory, if communities are to signal intolerance for
more socially corrosive—but more difficult to perceive—forms of criminal
activity, police must be allowed to use the technological tools enabling their
comprehensive surveillance of a suspect’s daily movements.
The problem for criminal procedure is the mission creep of broken
windows. With the technology to expand visibility, any crime, no matter
how hidden, about which the community might have knowledge becomes
socially corrosive. Knowledge is visibility. Technologically empowered to
look, police must maintain order lest social norms reinforce disorder. Thus,
police must be afforded the power to make visible what members of the
community might already perceive.
In this way, broken windows policing favors pervasive electronic
monitoring. With a proper vantage point, complex disorder can be just as
visible as broken windows. And complex disorder can be even more
corrosive to social norms and social meanings than low-level street
disorder. Because of the social harms disorder wreaks, the constitutional
meanings of criminal procedure impact police ability to investigate, and
thereby influence, social disorder. Justifications for order-maintenance
criminal procedures apply equally to the quotidian and complex case. In
this way, there is a reciprocal relation between order-maintenance practices
and the constitutional meanings of criminal procedure.
The Court’s opinion in United States v. Jones could be cast as a five
Justice majority for an approach to criminal procedure sensitive to the
aggregate effects of electronic monitoring on constitutionally protected
personal freedoms. Jones might also represent a majority view that
pervasive, month-long electronic monitoring goes beyond what is necessary
for order-maintenance policing focused on both everyday and complex
disorder, but that relatively shorter periods are permissible. Future
constitutional constructions of which facts are relevant and what constraints
are required depend upon whose needs—police or citizen—the Court has
primarily in view. They also depend on the social practices and priorities
the Court envisions as necessary to privacy and liberty. A complex and
never fully articulated social imaginary, currently motivated by ordermaintenance conceptions, determines doctrinal construction of Fourth
Amendment meaning. In order to see how order-maintenance theory is
woven into the current meanings of criminal procedure, a detailed look at

131
See id. at 370 (arguing that when people perceive street disorder, “individuals
understandably infer that the odds of being punished for more serious crimes are also low”).
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Justice Alito’s opinion for eight Justices in Kentucky v. King 132 is
instructive.
III. KENTUCKY V. KING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Three primary themes emerge from constitutional meanings
constructed to facilitate order-maintenance policing. One is that the
Supreme Court deems citizens to be empowered to take constitutional
responsibility for their interactions with police power. Because citizens
have autonomous agency, the Court, adopting a robust image of the liberal
self, constructs the citizen as being in control of her own responses, of the
police interaction, and of the means to assert her constitutional rights.
Second, the Court places consent at the heart of the person’s engagement
with police. If a person knowingly discloses information to another, then
one is imputed to have consented to its further disclosure to the police. If a
person deviates from scripts that construct the norms of interaction with the
police, then she is construed to have consented to the search that follows.
Third, constitutional rules must afford police ample discretion to control
expanding conceptions of visibility. These are central elements of
constitutional doctrine in service of order-maintenance policing. They are
the constitutional meanings by which the Court will construe the future
constitutional doctrine applicable in the world after Jones. These
constitutional meanings are on display in King.
In Kentucky v. King, 133 eight Justices joined an opinion that expanded
police authority to enter a private dwelling without a warrant when officers
suspect the imminent destruction of evidence they seek to obtain. In this
one case, many elements necessary to discretionary order-maintenance
policing are on display, suggesting just how pervasive the police-centered
perspective is in how the Supreme Court construes constitutional meaning.
Among these elements are the importance of exceptions that enable police
searches otherwise prohibited under ordinary constitutional rules, the
extension of quasi-property interests of police into the interior of the home,
the rigidity of conversational norms in the citizen–police encounter, and the
responsibility of citizens to vindicate their own constitutional rights without
assistance from courts or informed consent. A judicial outlook dedicated to
these aspects of order-maintenance policing will struggle to find
constitutional meanings that will forestall alteration of “‘the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic

132
133

131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
Id.
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society,’” 134 as Justice Sotomayor suggests is necessary to face the impact
of technology on police practice.
In King, police officers conducted a controlled purchase of crack
cocaine outside a Lexington, Kentucky apartment building. But matters
went awry. After the buy was completed, the nearby arresting officers lost
sight of the suspect who was presumed to have entered an unspecified
apartment. 135 In pursuit, officers focused on one apartment because they
smelled burning marijuana emanating from it. 136 As the opinion relates,
one officer testified that police banged loudly on the door and announced
“‘Police, police, police,’” “‘could hear people inside moving,’” and decided
to kick in the door. 137 Marijuana was present in the front room and the
officers performed a “protective sweep” of the whole apartment, revealing
further contraband and cash. After indictment, King moved to suppress the
evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the apartment and
eventually found a receptive hearing in the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Assuming, without deciding, that exigent circumstances existed, the
Kentucky Supreme Court suppressed the evidence, concluding “it was
reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police
would create the exigent circumstances.”138
The Supreme Court reversed, writing, “Where, as here, the police did
not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that
violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction
of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” 139 To arrive at this conclusion,
many of the elements of order-maintenance policing are in full view: the
police have an interest in preserving evidence that cuts into the privacy of
the home, the needs of law enforcement take priority over any discussion of
privacy, and the discretion to pursue consensual encounters and to interpret
citizens’ responses receives judicial deference. Because law enforcement
objectives overwhelm all other concerns, the Court’s opinion provides both
flexibility and deference to police practices, rejecting the idea that police
should be restricted from bootstrapping exigent circumstances as a way of
circumventing the warrant requirement.
134
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J.,
concurring)).
135
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1854.
136
Id.
137
Id. (quoting from the testimony of the officers as provided in the record from the
lower court).
138
King v. Kentucky, 302 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Ky. 2010) (quoting the analysis found in
Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Ark. 2004), and rejecting that court’s holding).
139
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858.
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What is significant about Justice Alito’s opinion is not just that it
“arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement in drug cases”140—the doctrinal takeaway as described
by the dissent—but that the opinion represents a mature manifestation of
the extent to which police exigency, in the home or elsewhere, dominates
constitutional considerations. But exigency is not a fact to be discovered in
the world independent of police conduct and objectives. Exigency is
constructed in pursuit of order. Police have an expectation of maintaining
order, even within the home, in pursuit of their preventative law
enforcement objectives. Thus, even as the Court rejects the idea that a
“police-created exigency” would be constitutionally deficient, the Court
must construct the constitutional meaning “exigency” will have in
analyzing the police–citizen encounter at the threshold of the home.
A. INVERTING JOHNSON: THE EXCEPTION AS RULE

Before defending these broad claims with a closer look at the opinion,
it is helpful to see how the present opinion stands in explicit contrast to its
historical forebears. Justice Jackson’s opinion in Johnson v. United
States 141 applied to similar circumstances as those in King—law
enforcement entered a dwelling without a warrant after smelling burning
narcotics. In Johnson, the Court drew the distinction between entry by law
and exercise of arbitrary authority. Justice Jackson’s opinion emphatically
asserted that “[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right
of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent.” 142 The alternative, the Court declared,
was to live in a police state. “Any other rule would undermine ‘the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ and
would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form
of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where
they are the law.” 143
Ignoring the dilemma between being “under the law” and a state where
police “are the law,” the Court in King distinguished Johnson on the
grounds that it did not address exigent circumstances. Despite the factual
similarities of a warrantless entry after smelling burning narcotics, the
Court emphasized that the Government in Johnson “did not contend that the
officers entered the room in order to prevent the destruction of evidence.”144
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 n.5.
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This factual distinction leaves in place the dilemma Johnson presents: either
the Court upholds a rule that requires a judge’s intervention or we will live
in a police state. One way out of this dilemma is through exigent
circumstances that permit dispensing with the warrant requirement. By
accepting the rule in the form of its exception, the Court can avoid
affirming the police state. The danger with this tertium quid is that the
relation between rule and exception is a delicate balance. The exception
must remain exceptional.
Under Johnson’s dilemma, a constitutional framework that denies the
priority of the rule “would obliterate one of the most fundamental
distinctions” between the police state and “our form of government.” 145
Yet, the exception is not at all exceptional in King. Indeed, it is difficult to
determine what is rule and what is exception, as the Court admonishes: “[A]
rule that precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to prevent the
destruction of evidence whenever their conduct causes the exigency would
unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established exception to the
warrant requirement.” 146 Ordinarily, exceptions to well-ordered rules must
be justified. After all, the rule is supposed to be the norm, and the
exception the abnormal. But in King the Court protects the exception
against “unreasonable” applications of the rule. Such analysis inverts the
priority of rule over exception.
There are two ways of understanding the relation between exception
and rule in King. First, one might ask whether the rule and exception are
now inversely related, i.e., whether the Court’s claim could be rewritten as:
“An exception that forces the police to obtain a warrant . . . would
unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established rule allowing police
to make a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence.” Such
an inversion clarifies what is norm and exception based on priorities and
expectations of what takes precedence over the other—the need for a
warrant or the need for discretionary flexibility. Second, one might
conclude that to “unreasonably shrink” an exception is another way of
saying that the rule simply has a narrower scope of application. Exceptions
narrow the application of a rule, and that is all the Court is expressing: a
limitation on the application of the rule. Textual evidence suggests
something more like the former option is correct, since the Court concludes
that, “the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the
conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same
sense.” 147 The presence of exigent circumstances is no longer an exception,
145
146
147

Johnson, 333 U.S. at 17.
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857.
Id. at 1858.
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but a rule unto itself.
To make a rule of exigent circumstances is to have come a long way
from Johnson, not simply as a matter of doctrine, but also as a matter of
constitutional meaning. For one thing, the Court emphasizes that the basic
rule is governed by a resurgent notion of “reasonableness” such that
“warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it
reasonable.” 148 Appearing in a number of recent cases, “reasonableness” is
increasingly becoming the touchstone of Fourth Amendment doctrine,
shifting emphasis away from strict adherence to the warrant requirement. 149
Other shifts are perceptible as well.
The Court in Johnson had firmly in view the constitutional
requirement of “balancing the need for effective law enforcement against
the right of privacy.” 150 In King, by contrast, privacy remains almost
invisible. The word “privacy” makes an appearance only once in the
majority opinion, when the Court summarily concludes: “This holding
provides ample protection for the privacy rights that the Amendment
protects.” 151 Justice Alito does not explain the content of these privacy
rights that the Fourth Amendment protects. Indeed, the grammar of this
sentence is striking. Referencing “the privacy rights that the Amendment
protects” 152 is consistent with those rights being a null set. Whatever
privacy rights the Amendment protects—if indeed it protects any—Justice
Alito is confident that a rule authorizing discretion and flexibility for police
to enter a private residence without a warrant provides ample protection.
Consistent with Justice Alito’s failure to mention the value of “privacy” in
his forceful dissent in Arizona v. Gant, 153 privacy, and the balancing it
requires, is demonstrably on the wane. 154
148

Id.
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness . . . .’”).
150
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. The Court also makes clear that: “The right of officers to
thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a
society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.” Id.
151
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862.
152
Id.
153
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
154
Another Fourth Amendment opinion that has emphasized the need to provide police
with clear rules in light of the split-second decisions they have to make in enforcing the law
is Thornton v. United States. 541 U.S. 615, 622–23 (2004) (“The need for a clear rule,
readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items
were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies” authorizing
law enforcement flexibility.). Justice Stevens’s 5-to-4 majority opinion in Arizona v. Gant
may come to look increasingly like a constitutional outlier, emphasizing as it does the need
to balance privacy interests in searches incident to arrest near an automobile by examining
how the issue “implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the
149
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Eight members of the Court in King adhere to some version of
increased salience for reasonableness, decreased emphasis on privacy, and
refined focus on law enforcement flexibility to have available exceptions to
doctrinal rules. Deprived of the robust articulation of privacy, liberty, and
security that populate its earlier articulations in cases like Johnson, the
Fourth Amendment’s meaning has shifted. 155
B. KNOCK, KNOCK: CONSENT AND DEVIANCE UNDER THE EXCEPTION

In moving from a constitution whose “whole point” is to avoid “the
dangers of a police state,” 156 to one whose meaning is limited by concern
that courts might “unjustifiably interfere[] with legitimate law enforcement
strategies,” 157 a new image of police–citizen encounters emerges. Under
the innovations of Warren Court criminal procedure, Courts and scholars
alike viewed the power imbalance that exists between the citizen and the
police officer as informing constitutional meaning. 158 For the person on the
street, such encounters could be fraught with danger because a local police
officer retains discretionary power unrivaled by any other governing
authority. An unpleasant interaction with other government officials might
mean the inconvenience of a delayed issuance of a permit, forestalled
resolution of a problem, or an unwanted imposition of a tax or fee. But an
unpleasant interaction with a police officer can lead to arrest, strip search,
“rough treatment,” and time in jail on grounds no more robust than “failure
to comply with an order.” 159 The arbitrary authority all too present in daily
concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a
person’s private effects.” 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
155
Justice Jackson, who wrote the majority in Johnson, stressed elsewhere that Fourth
Amendment rights are “indispensable freedoms,” and that “[a]mong deprivations of rights,
none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror in every heart.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
156
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
157
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860.
158
The Warren Court “revolution” led to what might still be described as an ongoing
counterrevolution designed to change constitutional meanings originally proffered by
Warren Court innovations. See, e.g., CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 6–36 (1993); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Criminal
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2468–70 (1996).
159
It does not take much effort to find an abundance of stories like the story of Mr.
Tuma, who was arrested in Washington, D.C., for expressing his views of the police, see
Pepin Andrew Tuma, Op-Ed, My ‘Crime’ on U Street? Offending the Police, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9, 2009, at C7, or the high-profile incident involving Henry Louis Gates, arrested at his
own home, Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A13. Incidents in New York City are reported in ELIOT SPITZER,
ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP &
FRISK” PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE
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police practice pervaded academic discussion and the emerging
constitutional meaning of criminal procedure. 160 That meaning focused on
human dignity and personality as reasons to be free from invasive and
arbitrary police encounters. 161
There was a time when the Supreme Court admonished through an
opinion by Justice Frankfurter that:
The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without
authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary
of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
162
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents . . . .

That same knock at the door has acquired a new constitutional
meaning in King:
Citizens who are startled by an unexpected knock on the door or by the sight of
unknown persons in plain clothes on their doorstep may be relieved to learn that these
persons are police officers. Others may appreciate the opportunity to make an
163
informed decision about whether to answer the door to the police.

Justice Alito’s conception of a citizen’s encounter with the police could
scarcely be more different than Justice Frankfurter’s view expressed a halfcentury earlier. For Justice Alito, no caution urged by “commentary of
recent history” 164 informs the view that citizens might appreciate the choice
necessitated by unlooked-for police intrusion at their doors.
Paving the way for Justice Alito’s view, prior cases characterized
encounters with police as consensual when police sought permission to
search the bags of passengers on a bus traveling interstate, explaining that:
Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It
reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1999), and in Deborah Sontag & Dan Barry, Disrespect as
Catalyst for Brutality: Challenge to Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A1. See also
HARCOURT, supra note 25, at 175–80.
160
As Charles Reich noted, “Police questioning carries with it the inherent danger of any
unchecked, unreviewable authority.” Reich, supra note 42, at 1168; see also JEROME H.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 229
(1966).
161
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (recognizing constitutional
foundations of “respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens”); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the
exclusionary rule to states because “without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard
as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”); Castiglione, supra note 5, at 661.
162
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
163
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011).
164
Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28.
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for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes
165
place, it dispels inferences of coercion.

The majority in King relies on this case for the additional claim that
encounters with police may be “cause for assurance, not discomfort.” 166 On
this view, the authority and danger inherent in interactions with police
disappear as police become like any other private citizen. Indeed, Justice
Alito makes this view explicit, commenting that “[w]hen law enforcement
officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more
than any private citizen might do.” 167 Such “common sense” social
imaginary belies empirical research. 168 The act of knocking on a door may
be an act “any private citizen might do,” but its social meaning—the official
authority manifested by the police, the potential negative consequences for
the citizen, or the pressures and expectations to comply—is far from what a
knock by any other mere citizen might entail.
Such “common sense” reasoning reveals how much the Court’s new
criminal procedure as inhabited by a social imaginary of the individual
person who is capable of standing her ground with informed knowledge
about her constitutional rights to police officers presumed not to present any
threat of arbitrary action or arrest for whatever discretionary charge they
may choose to make. Studies have shown the social imaginary for many
citizens to be very different. 169
It is not enough to say that the alternative constitutional meanings, by
contrast, have some empirical basis. Miranda v. Arizona, for example, had
before it the Wickersham Report, academic studies, police manuals, and
real examples of police abuse to illustrate the problematic interrogation
conditions populating the Court’s social imaginary. 170 King references no

165

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 (quoting Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
167
Id. at 1862.
168
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 153, 205 (discussing psychological studies that find that “people who are
targeted for a search by police and informed that they have a right to refuse nonetheless feel
intense pressure to comply and feel that refusal is not a genuine option”); see also Terry A.
Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 915
(2009) (criticizing judicial reliance on “common sense” projections of how persons might
feel or respond to particular circumstances).
169
See Gould & Mastrofski, supra note 40, at 343 tbl.6 (reporting findings of large
numbers of unconstitutional searches in everyday police practice); Bernard E. Harcourt,
Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 363, 366–68 (2004).
170
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445–58 (1966).
166
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such evidence of what “[c]itizens . . . may be relieved to learn”171 in
confronting police at their doors. Instead, the social meaning of the citizen–
police encounter is in part a product of constructed constitutional meaning,
not of background social facts. What a police encounter can mean for
individual experience is constructed in light of the Court’s view that the
Fourth Amendment does not interpose restrictions on consensual
exchanges. It would be nothing new to criticize the Court for failing to
consider empirical research necessary to construct an accurate picture of
how citizens understand their encounters with police.172 Facts are not the
issue. Interpretive meaning is. So too are competing social imaginaries.173
It is worth pausing to note that the constitutional meaning of consent
informing this social imaginary is the product of cases addressing the
voluntariness of citizen–police encounters. So long as a person has not
been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and is not
otherwise coerced, the encounter is consensual. Noncoerced consent is
present “[i]f a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the
encounter . . . .” 174 Police need not inform individuals of their right “to
decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter,” 175
leaving persons to their own devices to vindicate constitutional meanings in
complex interactive settings. 176 This understanding of consent sanctions
171

King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861.
Although greater attention to empirical evidence might improve judicial
decisionmaking processes in criminal procedure cases, my point is to call attention to the gap
that exists between constitutional meaning and social meaning, which empirical evidence
cannot fill. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 51 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 12 (1998).
173
As Taylor explains, social imaginaries include “the ways people imagine their social
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their
fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and
images that underlie these expectations.” TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 23.
174
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
175
Id. at 202 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)); see also Bostick,
501 U.S. at 434 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)) (“So long as a
reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ the
encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.”); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (refusing to offer a bright-line rule for consent because of the “endless
variations in the facts and circumstances” of searches).
176
The Court has declined in other situations to require police to inform individuals they
are free to go. E.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 216 (1984) (“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people
do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the
consensual nature of the response.”); see also Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The
Effects of Robinette on the “Voluntary” Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOWARD
L.J. 349 (2001).
172
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police practices meant to elicit cooperation from individuals traveling on
buses or subject to traffic stops where the dynamics of the interaction
remain ambiguous. 177 As a result, voluntariness becomes a way to strike a
balance between the needs of law enforcement and personal liberties.178 On
the one hand, it would be unduly constraining to forbid police from
approaching individuals to seek information relevant to a criminal
investigation or maintaining order. On the other hand, the Court must
adhere to the idea that individuals remain at liberty to decline interaction
with the police.
In constructing this balance, the Court also produces the conditions for
understanding an interaction as voluntary. Voluntariness, or consent to
interact with police, is not a natural kind waiting to be applied to
constitutional contexts, but is itself a product of those contexts.
Constitutional meaning—the way that Fourth Amendment doctrine creates
the terms to be balanced and the outcomes of that balancing—thus both
relies on and produces the social meanings and practices it purports to
govern.
It is the police request that occasions the possibility that the individual
might “appreciate the opportunity to make an informed decision”179 about
whether to interact, or continue to interact, with law enforcement officials,
as Justice Alito suggests. It is the Supreme Court that places that request
within constitutional meanings that play a role in constructing the social
meaning. In turn, the social meaning of the citizen–police interaction is
legible for the Court only in terms of its constitutional meaning—the police
have discretion to seek evidence and citizens are expected to comply or
confront uncertain risks (e.g., does the individual have a right not to
cooperate that the police officer will respect?).
Police officers on a doorstep may “have a very good reason to . . .
knock on the door with some force,” 180 and alerting residents “who [are] at
their doorstep[s]” may be “‘cause for assurance, not discomfort’” to those
inside, as the King majority instructs. 181 Moreover, the reasonable person
177
See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39–40 (“[S]o too would it be unrealistic to require police
officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be
deemed voluntary.”).
178
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[The court must balance]
the legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the
absence of coercion.”); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 738 (2000) (“[T]he Court made ‘voluntariness’ a placeholder for an
analysis of the competing interests of order and liberty . . . .”).
179
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011).
180
Id.
181
Id. (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002)).
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who may feel assured and free to decline the officer’s request for a colloquy
“presupposes an innocent person” 182—someone with nothing to hide. 183
Under Justice Frankfurter’s very different conception in Wolf v.
Colorado, 184 the innocent person had no more reason to feel assured than
the guilty one. The knock at the door for either, without judicially
authorized authority, meant something different. It imparted a political
meaning that expressed the significance of unwelcomed police presence in
everyday life. The image of the assured citizen comforted by that same
knock also imparts a meaning, one that signifies belief in the benevolent
discretion of law enforcement authority exercised on behalf of order and
security. Constitutional law under the former conception is meant to
interpose a limitation on police practice, shielding the individual from
unwanted intrusion. Constitutional law under the new conception expects
proliferation of police–citizen encounters as a principal means of law
enforcement practice aimed at maintaining social order. The “unwanted”
encounter is not to be avoided through law, but rather facilitated, for the
innocent person will appreciate the opportunity to “reinforce[] the rule of
law” 185 through her interaction with law enforcement officials. The very
idea that the encounter may be an “unwanted” intrusion is excluded from
the majority’s construction of the interaction. In construing the encounter
as a source of comfort or assurance, the Court does more than mark the
bounds of civility. It constructs an ideal image of a cooperative endeavor in
maintaining order and controlling crime.
Although community policing as a means of maintaining order in
urban areas may have experienced a doctrinal setback when the Court
construed the antigang ordinance in Chicago v. Morales as vague and
overly broad, 186 it has succeeded in projecting the identification of
community and police into criminal procedure.187 Because there is
alignment of interest in securing the community against disorder and decay,
the citizen and the police inhabit a relation of reciprocal trust. 188 The police
officer is free to knock on the door, while the citizen is free “to make an

182

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).
On the dangers of basing Fourth Amendment doctrine on the attitude that one “has
nothing to hide,” see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 21–32 (2011).
184
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police . . . is basic to a free society.”).
185
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
186
527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999).
187
See Kahan & Meares, supra note 26, at 1154.
188
See Kahan, supra note 53, at 101–02.
183
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informed decision about whether to answer the door to the police.” 189
Doing what any other member of the community might do, police knock on
the door as bearers of shared, not antagonistic, interests. As the Court
instructed in Drayton, “[i]n a society based on law, the concept of
agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own,” 190
implicitly addressing the contrary view that dignity and liberty are protected
only through Fourth Amendment restrictions on police–citizen interactions.
Asking for and receiving consent is an interlocutory practice that falls
outside the boundaries of criminal procedure. According to the Court,
whether social psychology reveals the actual exercise of freedom to be
illusory in light of the social structures in which it must operate is not an
issue that matters to the legal structure of the police–citizen relation.
Through this construction of social meaning, consent removes Fourth
Amendment restrictions from the interaction, granting a different kind of
constitutional significance to police practice, not as a threat to the liberty or
dignity of persons, as Justice Frankfurter warned, but as the occasion for
“agreement,” as Justice Alito imagines. Should this occasion lead to
discord instead, then the Court, having already placed the encounter within
a social meaning that erases the inequality of power, admonishes that the
residents would “have only themselves to blame for the warrantless
exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.” 191
C. THE CITIZEN-CREATED EXIGENCY

Contrary to the doctrinal framework lower courts had developed, there
can be no “police-created exigency.” 192 There can only be citizen-created
exigencies to which police must respond. Police create the context in which
citizens may choose whether to affirm or refuse the requests placed upon
them. Citizens, however, are not free to alter the context by choosing
different responses altogether. If they attempt to do so, they risk
authorizing actions otherwise unavailable to police.
A threshold
conversation implicates no criminal procedure prohibition, even as the
Fourth Amendment constrains other actions police may be tempted to take.
Without a warrant, the home is ordinarily inviolate to police searches, at
least so long as the individual stays within the prescribed script of the
police–citizen colloquy. Justice Alito, aligning the police officer with the
private person, acknowledges that “whether the person who knocks on the
189

Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011).
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207.
191
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862.
192
See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590–91 (5th Cir. 2004); United States
v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1990).
190
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door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private
citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak.” 193
What is more, “even if an occupant chooses to open the door and speak
with the officers, the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the
premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time.” 194
When persons deviate from the script, they are responsible for
changing the context. By choosing to change the context, they in turn invite
police to diverge from the script in ways that open up new possibilities for
actions otherwise regulated by the Fourth Amendment. In this way, what
the Court identifies as the “so-called ‘police-created exigency’ doctrine,” 195
which lower courts had used to prohibit searches made in response to
citizens who deviated from the interlocutory script, is really a citizencreated exigency.
As the Court construes the social situation, when police invite
residential occupants to converse at the door, they create a context in which
citizens may choose to speak with police or may choose not to open the
door or to speak. If in response to the knock at the door, the occupants
instead attempt to destroy evidence, they create a new context rejecting the
proffered reciprocity. With evidence being destroyed inside, police, who
sought only to engage in conversation at the home’s threshold, now face a
circumstance made exigent entirely by the choices of those inside. In light
of the citizen-created exigency, the Court withdrew the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches of homes. Armed
with probable cause but no warrant, police respond reasonably in light of
the altered circumstances by entering a home uninvited and conducting a
warrantless search to prevent further destruction of evidence.196 As the
Court explains, “[o]ccupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional
rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves
to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may
ensue.” 197 Because the occupants created the exigency, they bear the blame
for the subsequent police response.
By withdrawing Fourth Amendment protection, the Court inverts the
constitutional analysis inherited from majority opinions written by Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson employing a different social imaginary with
different constitutional meanings. “The knock at the door . . . without

193

King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (“[H]e
may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.”)).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1857.
196
Id. at 1858.
197
Id. at 1862.

2013]

MEANINGS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

727

authority of law but solely on the authority of the police” is no longer “to be
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights
enshrined” 198 in the American Constitution. Instead, the “knock on a door”
creates an opportunity for private persons to participate in a judicially
constructed script.
An occupant can stay perfectly silent, refusing to answer the door, or
the occupant can answer the door, thereafter making further decisions about
whether to answer questions or decline further interaction. Otherwise
permissible household activities may deviate from the expected script and
take on a new social meaning entirely dependent on the subjective fears of
law enforcement officers left waiting at the threshold. No matter how
mouse-like quiet occupants are, any noise (or none at all) could lead police
to fear destruction of evidence (being quiet as mice is very difficult, after
all). Regular noises might include quickly flushing the toilet because a
denizen has to exit the bathroom, where she was otherwise engaged in
private activity, in order to answer the door. Other household noises would
most certainly include the water-related noises the lady of the house might
make when taking her “daily sauna and bath” as Justice Scalia described the
paradigm of household privacy. 199 Of course, the occupants might also
make noises because they are busy draining and flushing their stash and the
police enter to discover their worst fears realized. Yet, under none of these
circumstances is a warrantless, forcible entry not exigent.
How police officers interpret sound in light of their fears and beliefs
determines the constitutional standing of the occupants—“solely on the
authority of the police.” Police may not “create the exigency by engaging
or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” 200
But so long as they do not make threats of this nature, “warrantless entry to
prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.”201
Because the police have a “need ‘to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence,’” 202 and because it would be unreasonable to shrink the scope of
the exigency exception to the warrant requirement for home entries, the
198

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (discussing the privacy intrusion of a
thermal imaging device used to monitor activities within the home that “might disclose, for
example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a
detail that many would consider ‘intimate’”); see also Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97
GEO. L.J. 485, 488 (2009) (“This far-fetched figure of the imagination [i.e., the lady of the
house] is apparently intended to evoke private acts that people care to hide from public
view.”).
200
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858. It is unclear what practical significance this apparent
limitation on police conduct would ever have.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
199

728

THOMAS P. CROCKER

[Vol. 103

Court defers to police interpretions of all they see, smell, and hear in light
of their fears and wants. Under this dynamic, as Justice Ginsburg notes in
dissent, police may simply “knock, listen, then break the door down,
nevermind that they had ample time to obtain a warrant.” 203 The exception
becomes the rule.
Under the circumstances police faced in King, however, a different
rule in this case would be just as easy: police may seek consensual
encounters on their own authority, but must assume the risk that in doing so
evidence might be voluntarily destroyed by the occupants within. If police
choose to forego acquiring a warrant, they may knock on the door to seek
consent to search but must bear the responsibility for a lost investigative
opportunity if the occupant asserts his or her constitutional right not to
answer. Assumption of risk is a familiar Fourth Amendment rationale.
When a person shares information or private spaces with another person,
she assumes the risk that the other person will reveal to authorities what is
shared. As the Court has admonished, “It is well settled that when an
individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that
his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities . . . .” 204
Although the doctrine places all the risk with the private person, there is no
reason why the Fourth Amendment cannot assign similar risks to law
enforcement officials. Moreover, a rule assigning risk to police officers
would be more consistent with the Court’s often-repeated sentiment that
“the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’”205
We are offered no explanation for why this rule does not vindicate Fourth
Amendment principles better than one that allows police to do precisely
what earlier Courts sought to prohibit. 206 An explanation must be found in
203

Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984); see also Crocker, supra note 5,
at 32–48.
205
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
206
The opinion considers a related possibility—that police should be prohibited from
entering when it is reasonably foreseeable that their actions would lead to destruction of
evidence. The opinion’s response is puzzling. First, the Court announces that a rule that
would place the burden on police would “unjustifiably interfere[] with legitimate law
enforcement strategies.” King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860. The Court considers some of these
strategies as reasons why police officers might want to delay seeking a warrant—for
example, they may want to see if they can get consent to search so they do not have to bother
with the burdens of a warrant. Id. No explanation is offered for why, when consent is not
forthcoming, a rule requiring a warrant before kicking in the door would “unjustifiably
interfere” with law enforcement. The Court then concludes from these considerations
something that can only be charitably described as a straw-man argument: “Faulting the
police for failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible time after obtaining
probable cause imposes a duty that is nowhere to be found in the Constitution.” Id. at 1861.
204
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the constitutional meanings and priorities the Court presents. These
meanings are more about constructing a vision of orderliness in which the
authority of police is no longer seen as a risk to the security of a free
society.
These order-maintenance meanings of criminal procedure prioritize the
needs of law enforcement over the liberty of citizens. They do so by first
constructing the social meaning of police-initiated citizen encounters in
terms of consent and then by giving that meaning constitutional status. So
long as police appear to respect the right of the citizen to decline to answer,
then the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Second, if the police–citizen
interaction deviates from prescribed scripts, the citizen will be held
responsible for creating the exigent circumstance given social meaning in
terms of the beliefs and desires of the police. Because the police want to
gather information and evidence, and because the police fear the loss of
access to each, the Court construes deviant citizen responses to be outside
the Fourth Amendment’s protections. By staying on the judicially
constructed script, the citizen ensures that other Fourth Amendment rules
apply, but when deviating, the citizen changes both the context and the
applicable rules. The interpretive paradox for the liberty of citizens is that
ordinary household activity can be deviant based solely on the interpretive
authority of police at the door. In this way, the exigent circumstances rule
authorizes police to enter homes without a warrant based on their fear that
inhabitants will destroy evidence—whether they in fact sought to do so. To
limit access to the home in this way might “unjustifiably interfere[] with
legitimate law enforcement strategies,”207 the Court observes.
Far from a constitutional limitation on police-created exigency, the real
problem that triggers legitimate policy authority is the citizen-created
exigency. Only by prioritizing the order-maintenance choices of police to
seek the colloquy in the first place can we arrive at the conclusion that
citizens create the exigency by deviating from expectations of orderliness in
how they dispose of their property in their own homes.
Third, the Court construes the implications of the threshold colloquy in
terms that erode the distinction between the home and street. Where the
Fourth Amendment is sometimes said to “draw[] a . . . firm but also bright”
line, 208 under the new criminal procedure, the line’s meaning is no longer
Of course, the Constitution does not require police to seek a warrant at the earliest possible
time—but the “earliest possible time” is not the issue. The issue is the reasonableness of
expecting police officers to have acquired a warrant before breaking open the door of a
private residence. For that proposition, one can find a constitutional requirement that police
seek a warrant—if, that is, one is looking.
207
Id. at 1860.
208
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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clear. Public activity is mostly transparent to police surveillance under the
Fourth Amendment, whether by physical or electronic eyes. Only when
monitoring enters the home does the Fourth Amendment bring a degree of
opacity to police activity. In an important case, the Court held that
monitoring the movements of an object on city streets could not be
maintained once it entered a house.209 The Court drew a line between the
public street and the private home. This “bright” line, however, darkens in
light of important exceptions that extend police interests inside the home.
As Justice Ginsburg asks in her King dissent: “How ‘secure’ do our homes
remain if police, armed with no warrant, can pound on doors at will and, on
hearing sounds indicative of things moving, forcibly enter and search for
evidence of unlawful activity?” 210
The constitutional meaning of the home shifts in the process,
becoming more like the public spaces over which police maintain social
order. Privacy depends on background constitutional rules that give
meaning to particular social practices. For example, the overnight guest in
a person’s home has privacy expectations the Court is willing to
recognize. 211 What is accessible or transparent to police inquiry depends on
what the Court finds already exposed to others. 212 What is publicly
available and what is visually transparent to surveillance cannot be private;
the Court has made clear, “What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.” 213 Public exposure extends to roads,214 curbsides, 215 fields, 216
209

See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (“Indiscriminate monitoring of
property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment
oversight.”).
210
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1865 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211
See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998) (holding a temporary houseguest
had no expectation of privacy); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (holding that an
overnight guest has a protected expectation of privacy because “[t]he houseguest is there
with the permission of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his
guest”).
212
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding information
found on loan applications publicly exposed for Fourth Amendment purposes).
213
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
214
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding that when a person
traveled on “public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact
that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction”).
215
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44–45 (1988).
216
See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.
There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the
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backyard greenhouses as seen from the air above, 217 conversations, 218 and
shared spaces including the home. 219 In each of these cases, privacy is
defeated by either the actions of the individual or the location of the
place. 220 By construing the actions of individuals inside the home as
creating the exigent circumstances to which police must respond, the Court
in King expands the domain transparent to police practice to include
intimate details available to “prying government eyes”221—or ears.
***
What appears more pressing to the Court—the prevalence of police
control over public space through stops and frisks or the constraints
criminal procedure places on police—creates constitutional meaning in
relation to everyday social meanings and practices. Very different
constitutional cultures are possible depending on whether the Court focuses
on protecting the privacy and liberty of persons under the Fourth
Amendment, or focuses instead on ensuring police access to wellestablished exceptions to doctrinal rules. 222 One case does not make a
trend, but the emphasis placed on policing practice in Kentucky v. King is
the product of doctrines developed over time under a perspective that
prioritizes providing bright-line rules to regulate police. 223 Moreover, the
fact that the exigency exception operates upon the privacy of the home
suggests how expansive the priority of order maintenance has become—
from the disorderly spaces of public parks and sidewalks to the doorstep of
the home. Although the Court does not talk in King explicitly in terms of
order and security, it is unmistakable how far the idea of order over public
space has come in arriving at the doorstep of the private residence.

cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”).
217
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
218
See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (“The risk of being overheard
by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of
risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”) (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 465 (1963)).
219
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 134 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
220
But see SLOBOGIN, supra note 75, at 108 (arguing that the Supreme Court is
misguided in equating “Fourth Amendment privacy with the assumption-of-risk and publicexposure concepts”).
221
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
222
See Crocker, supra note 16, at 312–45.
223
See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine,
given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in
their day-to-day activities.”) (internal citations omitted).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS OF ORDERLINESS AND THE
FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY
Changing technology, not simply changing doctrines, may open up
intimate details of the home or our relations with others to prying
government investigation.224 Even when the home is protected from
advancing technology, as it was in Kyllo, the Court held that use of a
thermal imaging device was a search “at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use,” 225 leaving open the
future possibility of a different result if social practices change. In the face
of other technological changes, such as the use of text messaging, the Court
has responded with minimalist holdings, 226 leaving open the question of
future protections. In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court refrained from
ruling on the Fourth Amendment implications of official searches of text
messages, reasoning that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its
role in society has become clear.” 227
The case for caution may be warranted,228 but as we have seen, the
relation between citizens and police does not evolve in a natural laboratory.
Policing practices develop, along with purported “expectations of privacy,”
in the shadow of Fourth Amendment doctrine. To withhold judgment,
however, entails conceding that constitutional meanings will, at least for a
time, follow policing practices, not lead them.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones was minimalist as well,
leaving undecided all the difficult questions that arise when police do not
intrude on property rights by attaching a GPS device to a vehicle.229 And
although more capacious in its embrace of the Katz framework of
reasonable expectations of privacy, Justice Alito’s concurrence was also
largely minimalist, distinguishing the presumptive constitutionality of
“relatively short-term monitoring” from the constitutionally impermissible

224
See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (2002) (“Electronic surveillance, one of the most
powerful technological law enforcement tools developed during the twentieth century, has
profoundly increased the government’s powers. The Fourth Amendment, however, has
stood by silently as this new technology has developed.”).
225
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. Orin Kerr notes that the technology has changed, casting into
doubt the holding in Kyllo. See Kerr, supra note 22, at 541.
226
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3 (1999) (defining minimalism as “the phenomenon of saying no more than
necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided”).
227
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
228
See Kerr, supra note 89, at 808–09.
229
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
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long-term warrantless monitoring in this case.230 Deferring to a future case
all of the “vexing problems” of creating doctrinal rules to implement
constitutional guarantees, Justice Alito’s concurrence hews closely to the
facts in Jones.
Neither approach questions any of the order-maintenance conceptions
of police practice on display the prior term in King. Two contrary scenarios
become possible. In the first scenario, order-maintenance concepts
accommodate the many ways that technology changes both what is visible
and the very nature of interpersonal visibility. In keeping with these new
forms of visibility, police are permitted discretion to use technology to
enhance their ability to see the patterns of disorder lurking within the
mosaic of everyday life, relatively unconstrained by Fourth Amendment
values or doctrines. As a consequence of this judicial decision, what is
judged properly visible to police changes the meaning and terms by which
individuals understand their relation to other people. It also alters how they
perceive and relate to state power. Under this view, persons cannot claim
the protection of privacy rights because the prior meaning of visibility
entails that no such rights are recognized for what is publicly revealed. Nor
can they conceptualize these police practices in constitutional terms as
impacting protected liberties. Pervasive police surveillance becomes a fact
of social and political life even while it shapes social practices and
expectations.231 Norms of orderliness as constructed by police practices
become the facts of everyday social life.
In a second scenario, rights to privacy and liberty remain highly salient
to how the Court constructs technologically enhanced police practice and
that construction’s meaning for interpersonal relations. Visibility is not
given independent and determinative meaning outside of constitutional
discourse. Rather, the Court constructs what is visible in light of
background understandings of interpersonal privacy and associational
liberty. Under this approach, what can be made visible through technology
is not construed as transparent to state authority—at least without a stronger
showing of state need in light of the constitutional values at stake. 232
230

Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Pervasive surveillance normalizes behavior not only through the disciplinary
mechanism of observation, but also through actual police interventions to enforce the order
that Wilson and Kelling contemplate. See FOUCAULT, supra note 71, at 213 (“[The police
are] an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body . . . . Police power
must bear ‘over everything’ . . . ‘everything that happens’; the police are concerned with
‘those things of every moment’ . . . .”) (citation omitted); see also Cohen, supra note 19, at
186 (“Surveillance in the panoptic sense thus functions both descriptively and
normatively.”).
232
Such a demonstration of need can be manifested through warrant requirements or
other proportionality tests. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 75, at 23–47; Slobogin, supra note 21,
231

734

THOMAS P. CROCKER

[Vol. 103

Constitutional meanings given to criminal procedures shape everyday
practices, establishing expectations of constitutional order that in turn
facilitate perceptions of legitimacy. 233
The first scenario follows from the majority’s opinion in King and
Justice Scalia’s minimalist opinion in Jones. The second follows from
Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurrence in Jones and Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in King. As with all constitutional law, the future in part remains
contingent on the Supreme Court’s choice to construe constitutional values
as constraining or facilitating state authority.
A. FROM KING TO AFTER JONES

Drawing parallels across doctrinal settings is hazardous. After all, the
doctrinal takeaway from King is that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit officers from knocking, listening, and entering a home without a
warrant when they have probable cause to fear imminent destruction of
evidence. And the doctrinal takeaways from Jones are that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits electronic monitoring involving a trespass and that
month-long electronic monitoring violates reasonable expectations of
privacy. If one focuses on doctrine alone, these are unrelated cases. What
makes King relevant to what happens after Jones is the background ordermaintenance orientation to monitoring—whether at the door or from the
police station. In each case, a particular conception of the appropriateness
of monitoring private activities is at stake, even in the purported sanctity of
the home. What is evident in King is a set of attitudes about the availability
of policing practices, even if they are exceptions to doctrinal rules, that
render the privacy and liberty interests of individuals invisible. In deferring
to the discretionary needs and perspectives of police, the Court
conceptualizes social practices as matters of consent or exercises of
autonomy without regard to how the imposition of state authority changes
the meaning of such encounters. These specific constitutional doctrines in
King are ways of implementing background constitutional values, beliefs,
and attitudes about constitutional priorities and meanings that have broader
implications for the future of the Fourth Amendment’s regulation of
technologically-enhanced police surveillance.
The boundaries between public and private, like the conceptions of
visibility and transparency, are fluid in light of the salience that orderat 35–37.
233
Legitimacy scholars focus on what motivates individuals to comply with the law or to
defer to police and focus less on how constitutional meanings shape background social
imaginaries for both citizens and officials. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
3–5 (2006); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).
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maintenance conceptions have in constructing constitutional doctrine. The
primary difference between the two forms of monitoring at stake in King
and Jones are time and distance. The appearance at the door in King is
relatively short-term but close-up, strengthening the distinction that Justice
Alito draws in his separate Jones concurrence between prohibited and
permitted monitoring. 234 Electronic monitoring will be from a distance,
with varying duration. If the Court follows the policing perspective it takes
in King, then only the most egregious forms of warrantless electronic
monitoring will fail under the order-maintenance Fourth Amendment.
As we have seen from analyzing the order-maintenance orientation of
King, three themes emerge, each realizing a relative absence of robust
consideration of the constitutional values of privacy and liberty. The Court
reinforces policing practices that depend on individual consent, relies on
individual constitutional responsibility in asserting and vindicating
constitutional values, and legitimizes police authority to control expanded
conceptions of visible space. These doctrines facilitate order maintenance
because they together afford police greater deference and discretion,
prioritizing the policing perspective necessary to maintain order and define
social meaning. They do not adopt, if it is even considered, the
constitutional rights perspective of individuals subject to such practices.
First, the constitutional values and principles through which Fourth
Amendment meaning is often expressed are completely absent. There is no
announcement of the need to preserve privacy or promote the liberty of
citizens to be free from intrusive government interference. Instead, the
Court’s construction of the issues is saturated by order-maintenace
emphases on discretion for and deference to police priorities. As a
consequence, the Court considers the practical implications of its doctrinal
rule for everyday police practice, evincing impatience with judicial
meddling that might “unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established
exception.” 235
Emphasizing reasonableness in police behavior over the formal
warrant requirement,236 the Court’s analysis depends on the perspective of
police practice, not personal privacy. The King majority notes, “The
234

Recall that Justice Alito thinks “relatively short-term monitoring” is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment, but long-term monitoring for one month is. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
235
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011).
236
By emphasizing “reasonableness,” the Court follows a view Akhil Amar has long
advocated: “The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean what they say.” AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 3 (1997); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1097, 1101 (1998).

736

THOMAS P. CROCKER

[Vol. 103

calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” 237 The constitutional
meaning of reasonableness is itself determined by “allowance for” facts of
contemporary police practice. Under order-maintenace priorities, what
might be “unreasonable” is for courts to interfere with well-established
discretionary police practices—an inversion of the issues that motivated
earlier Courts to protect privacy against what they saw as an encroaching
“police state.” 238 Without considering how constitutional liberty and
privacy might be impacted, the Court concludes that its decision in King
“provides ample protection for the privacy rights that the Amendment
protects.” 239 When privacy appears in Jones, by contrast, it is Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence that explores how those values are connected to
freedoms of expression and association necessary for democratic society.
When applied to emerging technologies, a constitutional analysis that
omits constitutional values will cede control over the meanings of privacy
and liberty to policing practice. What role technologies will play and what
kinds of practices will be construed as transparently visible will be defined
without the benefit of background articulations of the liberty and privacy at
issue. Because technology enhances the quality and quantity of police
surveillance at increasingly lower cost, absent constitutional oversight,
many more practices of everyday life will become visible to police.
Individuals will have the freedom from surveillance achievable through
legislative process, but without the normative guidance of judicial
constructions of constitutional values.
Second, the Court construes the central meaning of citizen–police
interactions in terms of voluntary consent. Policing practice is therefore
channeled into informal interactions designed to achieve its ends through
means otherwise formally regulated. Obtaining consent, after all, “is
simpler, faster, and less burdensome than applying for a warrant,” 240 as the
King Court explains. Relying on consent appears to respect individual
autonomy. The individual chooses to disclose information or not. The
individual chooses to answer the door or not. As Justice Alito surmises,
sometimes individuals might appreciate the opportunity to make a choice
whether to consent to police intrusion into their personal and private lives
or not. 241 The autonomous, liberal self, on this account, is constitutionally

237
238
239
240
241

King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948).
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862.
Id. at 1860.
Id. at 1862.
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protected so long as the constitutionally constructed and policeimplemented social script is followed.
The meaning of the liberal self’s choice, and the context and
conditions of the choice, depend on how the occasion for choosing is
construed both ex ante and ex post by the Court’s constitutional doctrine—
before by channeling police practices through doctrines that encourage lowcost investigative mechanisms such as stop and frisk or knock and talk, and
after by construing a person’s choice in light of the suspicions and
justifications as seen from the police officer’s perspective. The choices not
to answer the door or to attempt to avoid a scene where the unwanted
necessity of choice might be foisted upon an individual 242 are subject to
police interpretation backed by judicial deference. Thus, autonomous
choice does not arise from some idealized condition for liberal subjectivity,
but emerges from contexts already suffused with constitutional and social
meaning.
When applied to technology, engaging in consensual transactions with
others renders a person vulnerable to pervasive surveillance. Under the
logic of autonomous consent, when leaving a digital trace of these
transactions and connections, persons cannot later complain that state
officials collect and compile the available information. Technology leads to
transparency.
Moreover, consent becomes transitive.
Individual
transactional consent is easily transferred by third parties to state officials.
Aided by new technologies, law enforcement can aggregate third-party
information to create new informational assemblages that render greater
patterns of an individual’s everyday life transparent to observation.243
Third, the practice of individual constitutional responsibility is closely
related to consent. Just as the Court relies on individual autonomy to define
citizen–police encounters, constitutional responsibility and self-assertion
defines how and when individuals realize constitutional liberties. Under a
constitutional responsibility model, individuals are thought capable of
asserting and vindicating their own constitutional rights without interposing
doctrinal rules in the midst of the citizen–police colloquy. For example,
police are not required to inform individuals that they are free to leave at the
close of a traffic stop before engaging in further conversation that might
require individuals to make further choices in light of police requests.244
242

See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (“Allowing officers
confronted with such [unprovoked] flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite
consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent
in the face of police questioning.”).
243
Police aggregation of data is often justified as necessary to assemble the mosaic
pattern of underlying disorder. See COLE, supra note 17, at 20–21.
244
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (“[It would] be unrealistic to
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When it comes to third-party transitivity, individuals have the power to
keep information to themselves to avoid assuming the risk of further
exposure. If individuals fail to take proactive self-help to withhold
information or withdraw from commerce with others, then constitutional
constraints do not afford them protection against subsequent police access.
Or when police knock on the door, individuals need not answer or proffer
assistance to police entreaties but, as Justice Alito claims, “have only
themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances search that
might ensue.” 245 By claiming that consent can be voluntary, even when
there is an informational gap between what the individual knows and what
criminal procedure permits, the Court places the burden of constitutional
protection on the individual. As a conceptual, not an empirical, matter, the
Court relies on the individual to know when it is appropriate under the
Constitution to decline a police officer’s request to conduct a search or to
obtain information. 246
The problem technology creates is that the gap between personal
knowledge and constitutional rule may recede ever further, such that selfhelp mechanisms become futile. Whether subject to four-pawed senseenhancing technology 247 or the more paradigmatic digital kind, 248 the ability
of individuals to assert constitutional rights depends first on there being a
social encounter. Technology empowers police to obtain information from
prior disclosures or through other means of visibility and transparency,
obviating the need for interpersonal encounters. Thus, the occasion for
constitutional self-assertion, even for the well-informed individual, may not
arise.
And even when one might attempt to take constitutional
responsibility for shaping interactions with police, whether actual
conditions for the exercise of autonomy exist depends on the shared
background social and constitutional meanings that are at issue in the very

require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to
search may be deemed voluntary.”).
245
King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862.
246
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“So long as a reasonable
person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ . . . the encounter
is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.”) (quoting California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
247
See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058–59 (2013) (holding that training records
can establish a dog’s reliability for purposes of probable cause); Illinois v. Caballes, 543
U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“[T]he use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that ‘does
not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,’ . . .
during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.”);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he canine sniff is sui generis.”).
248
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding no expectation of
privacy in bank records).
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framing of the question of consent. As technology changes, the nature of
encounters with law enforcement officials—up close or at a distance—
might not reveal their constitutional status until any opportunity for selfhelp has already passed.
In addition to these three doctrinal foci, the future meanings of
criminal procedure, as constructed by order maintenance and technology,
will develop against a broader background of national security surveillance.
Though not always discussed in post-9/11 criminal procedure cases,
national security considerations may never be very far in the background.249
In Jones, Justice Alito’s concurrence alludes to investigations of
“extraordinary offenses” to which the Fourth Amendment would not
apply, 250 and Justice Scalia’s majority opinion explicitly asks whether
electronic monitoring would be forbidden in a six-month-long terrorism
investigation. 251 Emphasizing flexibility, uncertainty, and the need for
split-second judgments in situations not contemplated by either “emergency
assistance” or “hot pursuit” allows police room to maneuver when securityrelated matters are at issue. Whether responding to the extraordinary or the
unexceptional situation, order maintenance enables police to have expanded
control over visible space.
Because order maintenance fits well with national security
surveillance, the two policing perspectives will be mutually reinforcing.
Order maintenance builds connections from the quotidian examples of
disorder to the prospects of protean social relations. If we can control the
minor, we might forestall the major manifestations of social disorder.
Likewise, the strategy of the new national surveillance state is to find the
threatening pattern amidst incidental details of everyday life. Somewhere
in the vast mosaic of the everyday movements that people make are clues to
the next terrorist attack. Just as order maintenance does more than punish
minor offenders, sweeping into its reach vast numbers of innocent incidents
of everyday life, national surveillance requires developing digital dossiers
on millions of people who will never become terrorists, though they may
cheat on their taxes. In this way, national surveillance becomes the mirror
for order maintenance. Looking to prevent the next major terrorist attack,
national surveillance empowers government with knowledge about many
249
See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2160
(2002) (“Like the war on drugs before it, the war on terrorism is likely to leave us with a
different law of criminal procedure than we had before.”). The meanings of consent and
voluntariness have shifted in terrorism prosecutions as well. See Wadie E. Said, Coercing
Voluntariness, 85 IND. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2010).
250
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
251
Id. at 957.
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other, and much less significant, potential legal violations. Similarly,
looking to prevent more socially disruptive violent crime, order
maintenance focuses on attacking the development of such crime at its
purported source—in the everyday life of communities subject to minor
disorder. 252 A transformation in constitutional meaning was well underway
prior to the onset of the “war on terror,” but the emphasis on the ordinary
incidents of public order matches well the widely dispersed surveillance
imperative to “report anything suspicious to your local law enforcement
official.” 253
B. ORDER AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Because the aim of policing complex disorder is to aggregate
information from the mosaic of everyday life, future application of
constitutional constraints will have to address the nature of this new kind of
policing and its new technological tools. The challenge is to reconsider the
doctrines that make it difficult to analyze the aggregate social harm
perpetrated by pervasive and comprehensive electronic monitoring. 254 To
do this, the Supreme Court will have to attend to the constitutional harms
unchecked electronic monitoring imposes on the political liberties protected
by both the First and the Fourth Amendments. As Justice Sotomayor’s
Jones concurrence recognizes, the power to monitor personal movements
secretly is the power to use a panoptic perspective to acquire
comprehensive knowledge about personal beliefs and associations. Such
knowledge becomes power to chill the enjoyment of these constitutional
freedoms.
Justice Alito’s Jones concurrence recognizes that “society’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—

252
Balkin and Levinson make a similar point about the potential cooperation between
national security agencies pursuing data collection and local law enforcement. If such
information were shared, “criminal law enforcement will be transformed into increasing
surveillance of ordinary Americans to prevent not only the most serious threats to national
security, but also to everyday crimes, including perhaps misdemeanors and administrative
infractions.” Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Rehnquist Court and Beyond:
Revolution, Counter-Revolution, or Mere Chastening of Constitutional Aspirations? The
Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National
Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 525–26 (2006).
253
After 9/11, the Court provided even greater deference to police interpretations of
otherwise innocent conduct, indicating awareness that policing practice requires flexibility if
police are to find suspicion in the innocuous. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266
(2002); see also Stuntz, supra note 249, at 2157.
254
See Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of
GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable
Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 201 (2011).
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and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” 255
Coming, as it does, after Justice Alito has already diagnosed the problem of
circularity in protecting expectations of privacy, this recognition does not
connect the problems of the duration and substance of the monitoring to any
constitutional values beyond social expectations. To be sure, recognizing
the privacy limitations to aggregation and recording of all a person’s
movements is a necessary first step. But one step is not enough. To take
the second will require further inquiry into the constitutional meanings that
connect the Fourth Amendment to broader constitutional values.256 As
Justice Sotomayor recognizes, if privacy is construed to mean secret, then
privacy protections will not apply to the political liberties protected by the
Constitution.
In light of the conceptual and attitudinal hurdles King presents to the
Fourth Amendment after Jones, the question is whether the sheer volume of
information available through means of electronic surveillance will reorient
judicial understandings to restrict police discretion in the name of those
constitutional norms “basic to our free society.” 257 Such oversight will
require reaffirmation of constitutional norms readily apparent in a criminal
procedure focused on protecting constitutionally guaranteed personal
freedoms. 258 Justice Sotomayor goes further in her separate concurrence in
Jones, indicating that the Court might have to reconsider its third-party
doctrine. 259 Having in focus the liberties “basic to a free society” will lead
to different outcomes than decisions that focus on the order-maintenance
and security interests of policing practice.260 Such a judicial vision will do
so because, rather than the harms to policing practice that might occur from
imposing constitutional constraints, the Court would have in view the harms
of electronic monitoring to a democratic society.
If knowledge of the state one occupies is the first step to change, then
awareness of how far the Court has come in affirming a constitutional
culture premised on the order-maintenance needs of police may itself
255
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provide cause to reconsider further intrusion of “a too permeating police
surveillance.” 261 But reconsideration can only occur by seeing the Fourth
Amendment as protecting values of privacy and liberty that are given robust
consideration despite the constant pressure to facilitate police practices.
An implicit premise of this Article is the claim that the Fourth
Amendment should be understood to do more than facilitate the ordermaintenance practices of local police. It should regulate all electronic
monitoring, even if it does so permissively. The Fourth Amendment should
be read alongside the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause as
having a primary aim of protecting political liberty. 262 The aim here has
been to engage critically the Court’s doctrinal positions as displayed in
King in order to understand better the conceptual and normative hurdles to
be overcome after Jones. The primary question is one of constitutional
orientation and availability. A constitutional order focused on police
practices aimed at protecting the public order will not lead to greater
protections against pervasive police surveillance.
By contrast, a
constitutional order that acknowledges that privacy means more than
secrecy, that liberty protects interactions with others from unwarranted
monitoring, and that the interactions between citizens and police shape
political practices in a democratic society, will lead to renewed application
of constitutional meanings of criminal procedure in people’s everyday lives.
V. CONCLUSION
A constitutional order is a form of social order as well. It is one
derived from constitutional meanings implemented in the everyday lives of
the governed and governing alike. These meanings help organize our
politics. 263 They also organize the interactions between citizen and police.
Whether police practices will have a permeating presence in American lives
is a question the Constitution must be construed to answer. It may turn out
that the duration and intensity of electronic surveillance will remain
unconstrained by the Supreme Court’s construction of constitutional
criminal procedure. The vexing problems of interposing constitutional
constraints on everyday police practices may prove too daunting. 264
By focusing on the order-maintenance priorities of police, as King
illustrates, the future after Jones may depend more on the political
involvement of citizens in the legislative process. But it may turn out that
261
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in King and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Jones draw further support for viewing Fourth Amendment protections in
the context of the Constitution’s pervasive protections for political liberty.
By focusing on how electronic searches for complex disorder amongst the
mosaic of everyday life impact expressive and associational freedoms in
addition to “the right to be let alone” 265 under the Fourth Amendment, as
Justice Brandeis suggested, the future after Jones may unfold in light of
new constitutional meanings of criminal procedure the Court develops.
As we have seen, the doctrinal standpoint of King stands in stark
contrast to the view of Johnson, which warned of the excesses of the police
state more than a half-century earlier. Where once the idea of the police
state was something to be avoided, many of the elements of policing
practice that comprise such a state have been embraced within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, motivated in part by the prevalence of the theory
and practice of order-maintenance policing. Such a transformation is
remarkable and attests to the power of two ideas—intolerance of public
disorder and the importance of maintaining everyday security. The current
meanings of criminal procedure are not simply a matter of constitutional
doctrine, but are products of social and political practices that prioritize the
role of police in everyday life. In this way, the Constitution can come to
mean what the doctrines of criminal procedure say it means with respect to
policing practices and priorities.266 What counsels caution in how far we
embrace an extension of order-maintenance constitutional meanings and the
practices they enable is that retrenchment is difficult if Americans find they
no longer support the doctrines that impact their everyday and political
lives. 267 The constitutional meanings of criminal procedure speak to the
values of ordinary Americans no less than the priorities of their police.
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